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Summary 
TNCs and SME development 
Transnationalization of production is advancing 
rapidly, with trade and in particular foreign direct 
investment expanding much faster than produc-
tion. Within this process, transnational corpora-
tions (TNCs) are becoming more important as 
potential agents of the development of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Especially 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to develop-
ing countries and economies in transition have 
grown dramatically, increasing sixfold from 1990 
to 1998. Their share of global FDI inflows rose 
from 18 % in the mid-1980s to 42 % in 1998. 
Although FDI inflows are unevenly distributed 
among developing countries, with some NIC’s 
accounting for the lion’s share, the ratio of FDI to 
GDP is increasing even in the group of low-
income countries.  
FDI not only involves flows of capital but the 
transfer other important assets as well, such as 
management and organizational expertise, tech-
nology, entrepreneurship and access to markets. 
Products, production processes and management 
techniques of TNCs are usually close to interna-
tional best practices and improving constantly; 
total factor productivity levels are higher com-
pared to local firms in developing countries. The 
same applies to other performance criteria, such as 
product quality, the capability to generate techno-
logical innovations, etc. This performance gap has 
important implications for local SMEs. On the one 
hand, TNCs should be seen as sources of knowl-
edge and technologies, some of which may be 
copied or otherwise transferred to SMEs; on the 
other hand, there is always a threat of TNCs out-
competing local companies.  
The present study discusses the development po-
tential of different types of linkages and spill-
overs; it then presents case studies of successful 
TNC-SME linkages in three manufacturing activi-
ties; subsequently, the determinants of linkage 
formation and technological upgrading are dis-
cussed; and finally, the study presents policies to 
develop and upgrade local SMEs by way of link-
ing them to TNCs.  
Linkages and spillovers and their impact 
on SME development: An overview  
The present report analyses five types of linkages 
(which means the provision of inputs or use of 
outputs within a production chain) and spillovers 
(comprising all other ways of influencing part-
ners, competitors and neighboring firms):  
1. Backward linkages with suppliers. Most 
TNCs need a broad range of competitive, high-
quality inputs delivered on time. Since they can-
not produce the full range of parts, components 
and services in-house, they need efficient external 
providers of such products. Therefore, outsourc-
ing is increasing steadily. As a result, a well-
balanced structure of enterprise sizes may emerge 
in which the economies of large-scale production 
are ideally combined with the flexibility of small 
enterprises. SMEs can profit from this situation in 
a number of ways. The large enterprises, being the 
customers, open up new markets for them, often 
facilitate a regular receipt of payment, and relieve 
them of development and marketing tasks. More-
over, SMEs may be given important impetuses for 
modernization and growth.  
Yet not all supplier relations are equally beneficial 
to SME development. In most cooperative ven-
tures it is the suppliers that depend on the cus-
tomer to a high degree. This is the case especially 
if a TNC customer establishes the relationship 
with a supplier only to cut wage costs or to cush-
ion fluctuations in demand. On the other hand, if 
the underlying rationale of the customer is to 
make use of the supplier’s technological speciali-
zation, operational flexibility and/or economies of 
scale, the TNC cannot easily play one supplier off 
against another, which gives the SME partner a 
certain bargaining power. 
TNC customers tend towards stable and speciali-
zation-based relations with a limited number of 
reliable medium-sized suppliers. Supplier rela-
tions which are only based on fluctuating demand 
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and lower factor costs are often not compatible 
with rising standards as regards quality and reli-
ability. Good manufacturing practices are gaining 
in importance, which in turn presupposes a skilled 
and highly motivated workforce along the entire 
value chain. This implies increasing barriers to 
entry for potential SME candidates, but it helps to 
improve working conditions and creates opportu-
nities for technological upgrading within a select 
group of SME suppliers.  
2. Forward linkages with customers. TNCs may 
develop different types of linkages with custom-
ers. The most important link is with marketing 
outlets. In particular TNCs which outsource the 
distribution of brand name products often make 
considerable investments in the performance of 
their marketing outlets, e.g. automobile dealers, 
gas stations, restaurant chains and travel agencies. 
Outsourcing these activities implies considerable 
advantages for the brand-name companies, mainly 
that they may rapidly cover extensive markets 
while minimizing risks and investment in distribu-
tion channels. As TNCs are keen to maintain high 
and homogeneous standards in their downstream 
activities, they often provide comprehensive train-
ing for their distributors. The SME distributor thus 
benefits from the use of an established brand 
name, a proven business concept and the transfer 
of knowledge from the TNC. This greatly reduces 
the risk of failure. The most important and rapidly 
expanding mechanism for downstream relation-
ships with local SMEs is franchising.  
Another type of forward linkages is with indus-
trial buyers. Many transnational producers of 
machinery, equipment or intermediate goods pro-
vide assistance to their customers, which may be 
SMEs in developing countries. Most commonly, 
they send specialized personnel to train the cus-
tomers workforce on how to use the acquired ma-
chinery or equipment and provide repair services; 
but in many cases the transfer of knowledge goes 
much further, providing information on interna-
tional quality standards and market trends, helping 
to match SMEs with potential customers, etc. 
Such advice pays off for the TNC because ma-
chinery and intermediate goods may only be sold 
if the customer in turn manages to improve his 
own sales. Moreover, technical assistance helps to 
tie the customer to the provider of machinery.  
3. Linkages with competitors. Competition is the 
main driving force for technological learning. 
TNCs entering a developing country’s market 
may induce competing local companies to accel-
erate improvements. Empirical research has 
shown that there is a statistically relevant positive 
correlation between the technology imports of 
TNCs and the local competitor’s investment and 
output growth. Foreign investors may set new 
standards and create a healthy competition that 
stimulates innovations throughout the whole in-
dustry. On the other hand, if the local competitors 
are lagging far behind TNC standards, FDI may 
drive these firms out of the market. This (as well 
as acquisition of local competitors) leads to oli-
gopolistic market power and may hinder endoge-
nous technological development. 
4. Linkages with technology partners. Some 
TNCs initiate joint projects with indigenous SME 
partners. These projects may take various forms of 
equity or non-equity linkages, including joint ven-
tures, licensing agreements and strategic alliances. 
Some host-countries require foreign investors to 
take on local partners in joint ventures or to li-
cense technology to local firms. In other cases, 
linkages with technology partners arise voluntar-
ily, because both parties identify complementari-
ties and anticipate benefits from partnership: From 
the point of view of SMEs such linkages are 
mainly seen as mechanisms to gain access to new 
fields of knowledge and technology, while TNCs 
may look for indigenous partners because they 
provide access to local politics, institutions, and 
markets. Yet the fact that both partners pursue 
different goals often leads to conflicts: Local part-
ners will try to gain as much access as possible to 
specific knowledge and technology of their for-
eign counterparts, while their technologically 
more advanced partners will usually try to avoid 
any leakage of specific knowledge. Therefore the 
distribution of benefits requires complex and con-
tinuing bargaining.  
5. Other spillover effects. TNCs sometimes 
transfer know-how to local SMEs which are not 
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directly linked to them as suppliers. Two indirect 
spillovers are especially important: Demonstration 
effects occur as TNCs introduce new, often more 
efficient ways of doing things, thus providing 
showcases for innovation. By observing and copy-
ing from TNC strategies, local entrepreneurs may 
imitate TNC products and management tech-
niques, develop new ways of inter-firm division of 
labor or gain access to non-traditional markets. 
This may happen as a spontaneous, even uncon-
scious process or as a planned and systematic 
benchmarking exercise.  
Human capital spillovers occur whenever TNCs 
train personnel beyond their own needs. As TNCs 
usually have more advanced equipment, more up-
to-date production processes and management 
techniques as well as higher quality standards than 
local companies, they place higher demands on 
their workforce and usually invest more in train-
ing. Even if TNC employees do not participate in 
training activities, they may acquire certain skills, 
attitudes and ideas just by working in a plant that 
conforms to international production standards. 
Moreover, experienced TNC personnel may quit 
their jobs in the company in order to use the ac-
quired technical or management skills to set up 
independent local companies (spin-offs). Some 
TNCs are thus "invisible colleges" which make 
substantial contributions to skill formation in the 
host country.  
Case studies of successful TNC-SME  
linkages  
Three case studies of different manufacturing 
activities are presented: the electronics hardware, 
automotive, and apparel industries.  
The electronics hardware industry is one of the 
most dynamic manufacturing industries in devel-
oping countries and is supposed to be one of the 
most promising for spillovers. In many Southeast 
and East Asian countries, manufacturing of elec-
tronics is the leading industrial sector in terms of 
investment, industrial output, value added, exports 
and employment. The industry is largely domi-
nated by TNCs. Recently, developing countries 
outside Asia have been gaining importance as 
preferential investment sites for electronics TNCs, 
e.g. Mexico, Costa Rica and Hungary. In the early 
years, only simple assembly, testing and packag-
ing operations had been transferred to developing 
countries. Yet today electronics TNCs increas-
ingly concentrate on developing, designing and 
marketing their products, and thus often outsource 
the whole process of manufacturing. This opens 
important windows of opportunity for subcontrac-
tors, who become experts in assembling standard-
ized products. Moreover, as automation increases, 
electronics TNCs demand more specialized tool-
ing such as jigs and fixtures for automated assem-
bly. This is another niche market for supporting 
SMEs. 
The study analyzes three leading TNC-driven 
electronics production sites which represent dif-
ferent stages in the development from a mere fac-
tor-cost based agglomeration of assembly plants 
to a knowledge-based industrial cluster with a 
vibrant development of complementary SMEs. 
Guadalajara (Mexico) is the most recent agglom-
eration of TNCs, but up to now no supporting 
local companies have emerged; Penang (Malay-
sia) is a more mature production site with a con-
siderable dynamics of local supplier and skills 
development, but still very limited innovative 
capabilities. Finally, Singapore has upgraded from 
a simple assembly site to a dynamic cluster spin-
ning off innovative SMEs and developing world-
class suppliers. The different performance of 
those clusters can be explained by four main fac-
tors: First, there is always a time-lag between the 
first TNC investments and the take-off of supplier 
development: In Singapore and Penang, vigorous 
supplier development started about 10-20 years 
after the first massive inflows of FDI in electron-
ics; second, the industrial life-cycle: Singapore 
became involved in electronics manufacturing 
when this industry was quite young. Local suppli-
ers thus did not face a well-established interna-
tional competition; third, the efforts to upgrade the 
engineering and technical skill base; fourth, poli-
cies to develop and upgrade promising local com-
panies.  
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In many large developing countries the automo-
bile industry represents a significant portion of 
the overall manufacturing activity in terms of 
output and employment. In addition to this direct 
contribution, the industry is considered important 
to economic development because of its strong 
backward linkages and its large share in the con-
sumption of selected inputs, such as iron and steel 
products, aluminum alloys, etc.  
Until the mid-1990s, many developing countries, 
especially those with relatively large domestic 
markets, pursued protectionist policies to develop 
national automobile – or at least automobile sup-
plier – industries. Most of these countries had 
introduced high tariffs for imported cars, thus 
inducing foreign carmakers to build local assem-
bly plants in order to serve the respective domes-
tic markets. In addition to high import tariffs, 
governments imposed local-content and other 
requirements on carmakers in order to build local 
supplier networks. Yet as import-substitution 
policies limited trade and competition, the emerg-
ing automobile (and supplier) industries were 
usually less efficient than world-market competi-
tors. Although undoubtedly some technological 
learning took place, mostly concerning new or-
ganizational and management concepts and the 
mastery of standard techniques, little progress was 
made regarding the development of innovative 
capabilities.  
Only recently has liberalization exposed transna-
tional affiliates and local companies to interna-
tional competition and forced the automobile in-
dustries of developing countries to modernize and 
restructure. Most governments have already re-
laxed their restrictions on foreign investment in 
the automobile industry. A growing number of 
countries now permit 100 % foreign equity. 
Moreover, local content, export and technology-
licensing requirements are being phased out and 
import restrictions lifted.  
Liberalization of automobile policies will have 
far-reaching consequences. Where countries pur-
sued National Car projects, these will hardly be 
able to continue without selling a majority stake to 
one of the large foreign car companies. Where the 
automobile industry is dominated by TNCs, as in 
most developing countries, these corporations will 
move away from multi-domestic production, 
where local assembly plants with suboptimal 
scales of production have assembled a broad 
range of models for the respective national mar-
ket, rationalize production and start to integrate 
global or at least regional networks of specialized 
affiliates sharing parts and manufacturing proces-
ses.  
With modernization of assembly plants and their 
reorientation towards a global or regional division 
of labor, TNCs need to modernize their supplier 
base as well. In many cases, carmakers induce 
their established home-base suppliers to follow 
them to the respective foreign markets. In this 
process, many inefficient local suppliers are being 
taken over or crowded out. As a result, liberaliza-
tion in developing countries is leading to a spe-
cific form of clusters which are dominated by 
transnational carmakers and their leading foreign 
suppliers. To what extent local SMEs will be able 
to integrate into the auto-parts industry – at least 
into the lower tiers of the production pyramid – 
depends on the competitiveness of the national 
industry and the availability of support pro-
gramms.  
Apparel is not only one of the most important 
industries during the early stages of industrial 
development, and one of the main sources of ex-
port revenues for developing countries, it is also 
an industry in which subcontracting arrangements 
between large and small firms are widespread. 
Moreover, barriers to entry for indigenous SMEs 
are low, especially in assembly operations.  
Assembly is very difficult to automate and there-
fore highly labor-intensive. Due to this labor in-
tensity, assembly accounts for about 80 % of 
value added in apparel production. Accordingly, 
there is a strong incentive to subcontract this pro-
cess to low-cost producers, either within a given 
country or from high-wage to lower-wage coun-
tries. Subcontracting of apparel assembly is thus 
mainly motivated by labor-cost advantages. In 
some cases, customers contract out to other firms 
to cope with fluctuating demand. The apparel 
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chain is therefore quite different from the elec-
tronic-hardware and automobile industries, where 
subcontracting is largely due to the productivity 
gains of complementary specialization.  
As entry barriers for new garment assembly plants 
are low, competition is fierce, and margins are 
usually low. In contrast, high rents may be ob-
tained in apparel marketing. The profitability of 
apparel companies largely depends on two as-
pects: their ability to generate "brand-name rents" 
by building a positive product image, and their 
ability to manage the supply chain efficiently, i.e. 
by organizing quick and reliable delivery of high-
quality apparel. Therefore many TNCs in the ap-
parel business emphasize the need to build global 
brands and improve their retail logistics, while 
they outsource garment assembly to independent 
companies.  
Traditionally, subcontractors received cut fabric 
and returned the assembled garment. Today, in-
ternational retailers and marketers increasingly 
work with full-package suppliers. Full-package 
means that the supplier makes the garment ac-
cording to a design specified by the customer, but 
he himself takes on the responsibility of sourcing 
the necessary inputs and delivering the finished 
product, including labeling, packaging etc. This 
trend implies considerable opportunities to up-
grade local SME suppliers. It enhances the ability 
of local entrepreneurs to learn the preferences of 
foreign buyers, including international standards 
for price, quality, and delivery of export merchan-
dise. It also generates substantial backward link-
ages in the domestic economy because contractors 
are expected to develop reliable local sources of 
supply. 
While the opportunities for technological learning 
are considerable in the segment of full-package 
suppliers, this is usually not the case in simple 
second- and third-tier garment assembly. Yet 
there are some exceptional cases where first-tier 
suppliers or traders offer advice on shopfloor or-
ganization, quality standards, etc.  
Summing up the lessons of the case studies, we 
observe that TNCs increasingly specialize in cer-
tain stages of the value-adding process while at 
the same time intensifying interactions with their 
partners upstream and downstream along the 
value chain. As inter-firm cooperation becomes 
more complex, spatial proximity to suppliers and 
customers becomes an important advantage. 
TNCs are therefore often interested in intensifying 
linkages with neighboring firms. As a result, new 
windows of opportunity for specialized SME 
partners are opening up, especially in non-tradable 
business services and niche products with limited 
economies of scale.  
At the same time, as global competition increases, 
TNCs place higher demands on their partners. 
SME partners must come close to international 
standards concerning product quality, price, and 
terms of delivery. If local companies lack these 
conditions, TNCs often prefer to induce their 
proven international partners to follow them to the 
respective host country. As a result, transnational 
clusters may emerge which have very few links to 
the local economy. 
Determinants of successful linkage forma-
tion and technological upgrading  
The intensity of TNC-SME linkages and the abil-
ity of countries and individual firms to exploit 
such linkages for technological upgrading varies 
greatly, depending on the interplay of three sets of 
factors:  
1. the existence of SMEs which have the poten-
tial to meet high TNC standards;  
2. the TNC corporate strategy;  
3. the existence and efficiency of a set of sup-
porting public policies.  
The competitiveness of local SMEs. The main 
reason for the weakness of linkages and spillovers 
from TNCs to local SMEs is the lack of efficient 
SMEs able to seize new business opportunities 
related to foreign direct investment. Entry barriers 
for partnership with TNCs differ considerably, 
mainly according to  
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1. the envisaged type of partnership: Demands 
on suppliers are not the same as demands on 
distributors or joint venture partners; 
2. the motives as to why TNCs seek partnership 
with local SMEs, e.g. to acquire new tech-
nologies, to exploit the advantages of spe-
cialization, to cut labor costs or to improve 
access to government bureaucracies. More-
over, partnership may be mandatory or volun-
tary; 
3. characteristics of the industrial activity, e.g. 
technological complexity, capital and scale 
requirements.  
As regards SMEs as suppliers to TNCs, barriers to 
entry may be quite low, especially in technologi-
cally simple and labor-intensive activities, such as 
assembly of apparel, shoes and toys. In these ac-
tivities, lower wages and labor standards, the ex-
ternalization of environmental costs or the readi-
ness to accept unstable demand conditions may be 
sufficient to be accepted as a TNC supplier. Nev-
ertheless, compliance with quality standards is 
becoming more and more important, especially 
where production is associated with a company or 
brand name. Even if supplier relations are cost-
driven, most TNCs will not compromise on qual-
ity. One may therefore assume that the low wage-
low standard-type of subcontracting will slowly 
disappear in global production chains. In techno-
logically complex activities, such as electronics 
and automobiles, demands on suppliers are espe-
cially high. SME partners are increasingly re-
quired to invest in R&D on their own in order to 
constantly improve their products and participate 
in joint innovation projects with their customers.  
As regards SMEs as customers of TNCs, espe-
cially as franchisees, barriers to entry are rela-
tively low. One of the main advantages of fran-
chising is that this scheme requires fewer entre-
preneurial skills than an independent, non-
franchised enterprise. Besides the basic manage-
ment skills for running a business, entrepreneurs 
mainly have to adhere to certain quality standards 
and bear some capital costs related to investments 
in the the respective marketing outlet as well as a 
franchising fee.  
Regarding SMEs as partners in joint ventures, we 
first have to distinguish between mandatory and 
voluntary joint ventures. If foreign investors have 
to take on a local partner for reasons of mandatory 
national equity, local candidates only have to 
compete with other domestic firms, and barriers to 
entry are therefore relatively low. Yet empirical 
evidence shows that joint ventures forced on an 
unwilling TNC are rarely successful, and they are 
often unsustainable once the equity requirements 
are withdrawn. If the partnership is voluntary, the 
local SME must be able to identify suitable coun-
terparts partners for a sustainable win-win part-
nership and to negotiate favorable contracts. 
Moreover, they need to achieve minimum effi-
ciency standards and contribute specific assets to 
the partnership. These may either be technological 
or based on familiarity with local politics and 
government regulations as well as knowledge of 
local markets.  
The TNC corporate strategy. TNCs pursue dif-
ferent corporate strategies which may be more or 
less conducive to local SME development and 
technological learning. These strategies are usu-
ally closely related to the motive why the TNCs 
engage in the host country, i.e. whether the affili-
ate is seeking resources, markets, efficiency or 
strategic assets and capabilities. In the past, mar-
ket-seeking investors often developed substantial 
supplier linkages because markets were less de-
manding and because host countries imposed do-
mestic-content requirements. Resource-seeking 
and export-oriented investors, by comparison, 
created relatively few linkages, but these linkages 
with local suppliers were more competitive and 
sustainable. 
Beside the motives for investing in a given devel-
oping country, many other aspects shape the 
TNC’s willingness to develop linkages with local 
SMEs. These include the degree of technological 
sophistication and economies of scale, the length 
of time the TNC has been operating and gathering 
experience in the host country, the specific corpo-
rate culture, the geographic proximity and transac-
tion costs between parent company and affiliates, 
the TNC’s market position and the host country´s 
trade policy.  
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Policies to enhance linkages and spillovers be-
tween TNCs and local SMEs  
Public policy has an important part in enhancing 
linkages and spillovers. Today there is consider-
able agreement that policies to restrict FDI and to 
impose local content, technological licensing or 
equity requirements are rarely effective, unless the 
respective government is endowed with special 
political and administrative capabilities. Yet liber-
alization of investment policies is not sufficient to 
exploit the opportunities of linkage formation and 
technological learning. In order to enhance link-
ages and spillovers between TNCs and local 
SMEs, policies should aim to: 
– improve the general performance of SMEs,  
– attract foreign direct investment and  
– upgrade local SMEs linked to TNCs. 
The study only gives a brief overview of the first 
two issues and places emphasis on specific poli-
cies for upgrading local SME related to TNCs.  
General policies to improve the performance of 
local SMEs. In the process of industrial moderni-
zation, large companies tend to outcompete SMEs 
in scale-intensive activities, but at the same time 
these companies often create new markets for 
specialized SMEs – subcontractors, suppliers of 
parts and components, franchisers, after-sales 
services – and they always leave some niche mar-
kets to be exploited by local SMEs. As this struc-
tural change of industrial organization proceeds, 
SMEs inevitably have to assume new roles.  
Industrial (and especially SME) policy should 
help to cope with this structural change and enable 
SMEs to adapt to the new rules of competition. 
Promotion should aim at developing an integrated 
production system where small companies spe-
cialize in activities which complement large-scale 
production and exploit niche markets (e.g. cus-
tomized products and specialized business ser-
vices). The challenge is to establish a core group 
of dynamic SMEs rather than providing indis-
criminate assistance to SMEs and microenter-
prises in traditional activities where they do not 
possess competitive advantages vis-à-vis large 
firms. This calls for selective policies, including 
innovation policies for SMEs, venture-capital 
funds for start-up companies, programs to foster 
university spin-offs, and, last but not least, poli-
cies to link SMEs up with large companies.  
Policies to attract foreign direct investment. As 
the global economy becomes more open to inter-
national business transactions, countries increas-
ingly have to compete for foreign investors, and 
restrictive FDI policies can effectively deter TNCs 
from investing in the respective country. In addi-
tion to liberalizing their FDI policies, three ele-
ments are crucial to successfully attracting FDI, 
especially if the focus is on "developmental" 
TNCs which are likely to generate considerable 
domestic linkage and spillover effects:  
1. Formulating a vision and targeting FDI to this 
aim. Host countries should formulate strategic 
goals and try to identify windows of opportu-
nity relating to foreign investment, i.e. define 
areas which are promising for national devel-
opment. Policies to attract FDI should be se-
lective and embedded in a comprehensive na-
tional development strategy.  
2. Creating and promoting a positive image of 
the location. Promotion, especially sector-
specific investment missions combined with 
firm-specific research and customized adver-
tising, is cost-effective. Investment promotion 
agencies should be organized in a businesslike 
manner and develop a culture and attitude ori-
ented towards the private sector. Some of their 
services may be transferred to private service 
providers.  
3. Improving advanced and specialized factors in 
accordance with technological goals. Most 
developing countries seek to attract foreign di-
rect investment focusing on a combination of 
low factor costs (especially for labor and natu-
ral resources) and subsidies. These factors are 
usually not sufficient to sustain long-term 
competitiveness. In order to achieve techno-
logical upgrading, advanced and specialized 
factors of production need to be developed, 
including specific human-capital formation, 
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R&D activities, specific infrastructure in 
fields such as information technology, etc. 
Specific policies to upgrade local SMEs 
linked to TNCs  
Besides the improvement of the general policy 
framework which is necessary to improve the 
performance of SMEs and to attract FDI, specific 
policies to develop and upgrade TNC-SME link-
ages and to promote the transfer of know-how 
from TNCs between SMEs are recommended. 
These include supplier development, improve-
ment of forward integration with customers, pro-
motion of technology partnerships and support 
measures to enhance know-how transfer from 
TNCs to local SMEs which are not directly linked 
as suppliers, customers or technology partners.  
Supplier development. Studies on programs to 
support the development of local suppliers to 
TNCs highlight four important "lessons learnt." 
Supplier policies should: 
– focus on voluntary measures to support the 
local supplier base rather than to impose do-
mestic-content requirements and market-
reservation policies; 
– be based upon a medium- or long-term vision 
concerning the envisaged intrafirm division 
of labor; targets and target groups should 
clearly be defined, and policy-makers should 
have an idea of what types of supplier rela-
tions are conducive to sustainable competi-
tiveness; 
– make sure from the beginning that large cor-
porations are involved in and committed to 
supplier development programs; 
– be coherent, well-coordinated and transpar-
ent. There should be one lead agency for sup-
plier development working hand-in-hand with 
specialized agencies. 
Among the policies for supplier development, 
events to inform SMEs about opportunities to 
supply goods and services as well as institutions 
to match SME supply with the demand of TNCs 
are especially important. Matching institutions 
include subcontracting exchange schemes as well 
as supplier fairs and exhibitions. These instru-
ments are helpful to set up first contacts between 
customers and suppliers. However, matching is 
usually not sufficient to establish lasting coopera-
tion, because participating suppliers do not meet 
all the standards required by customers. The latter 
should be asked to cooperate with the organizers 
of the matching event in order to help them iden-
tify bottlenecks and promotion needs of potential 
suppliers. On this basis, taylor-made support 
measures including advice on manufacturing and 
logistics, training, financing and other services 
may be offered to promising SMEs. Matching 
institutions may thus be seen as first steps towards 
an integrated supplier promotion scheme. 
Some countries offer economic incentives to in-
tensify supplier relations and technology transfer. 
These incentives may either benefit customers or 
suppliers. Yet such incentives are costly and make 
sense only if potential customers are really inter-
ested in local suppliers, if the competitiveness of 
SME candidates does not lag too far behind and if 
supplier relations do not develop without these 
incentives. 
Forward integration with customers. In most 
cases franchises develop at the initiative of the 
entrepreneurs and do not necessarily require gov-
ernment action or even donor interventions. In 
some countries, private-sector franchise associa-
tions exist which provide services to the national 
franchising community. Moreover, some consul-
tancy firms have specialized in franchise opera-
tions. Nonetheless, some countries and interna-
tional organizations have adopted programs to 
encourage franchising as an instrument for devel-
oping SMEs. Measures to support franchising 
include organizing events for awareness building, 
reviewing the existing legal requirements regulat-
ing the franchising business, the establishment of 
a one-stop franchising agency, facilitating con-
tacts between international franchisers and poten-
tial local franchisees, encouraging and supporting 
the establishment of national franchising associa-
tions, providing consultancy and training for po-
tential franchisees during the initial phases of 
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establishment of contacts, negotiation of contracts 
and setup of the new enterprise,  helping to 
develop indigenous "SME-to-SME" franchises, 
and providing finance. 
Promotion of joint ventures. Taking into ac-
count that the imposition of mandatory shared 
ownership has rarely led to the expected results, 
public policy should rather promote voluntary 
joint ventures. In this respect, information services 
for and coaching of (potential) joint venture part-
ners is the most important field of support. Joint-
venture partners, especially inexperienced SMEs 
from developing countries, often lack relevant 
information and the capability to foresee all the 
implications of a joint venture. Investment promo-
tion agencies may enable local candidates to iden-
tify their own strengths and weaknesses, assess 
the contribution expected from the foreign partner 
and to negotiate favorable contracts. Coaching 
may be necessary in subsequent stages of joint-
venture development in order to match different 
corporate cultures or to help renegotiate the terms 
of cooperation. 
In addition, many countries set up databanks and 
organize journeys to match local and foreign 
companies, yet most practitioners feel that these 
activities rarely lead to the formation of new joint 
ventures. Likewise, some government agencies 
offer financial support for joint ventures, although 
for viable projects finance is rarely the relevant 
bottleneck. Instead of offering soft loans, public 
authorities should rather help interested SMEs to 
improve their joint-venture plans, leaving finan-
cial services to the private banking sector.  
Other policies to promote spillovers from 
TNCs to SMEs. Although private-sector firms are 
usually very careful to avoid any leakage of par-
ticular information which is part of their core 
competences, this does not apply to know-how 
concerning universal principles of industrial or-
ganization. Most TNCs are clearly ahead of local 
companies in fields such as human resources 
management, quality management, statistical pro-
cess control, plant layout and logistics. As this 
knowledge is often not considered part of the spe-
cific set of core competences, TNCs may be quite 
willing to share this information. Disseminating 
this kind of information among the local business 
community may even benefit the TNC, since it 
helps to improve their image as good corporate 
citizens.  
SME promotion agencies may help to organize 
such a voluntary transfer of know-how. They may 
identify suitable TNC subsidiaries, convince them 
to share their experience with local companies, 
organize factory visits, and document and dis-
seminate the respective experience among local 
companies.  
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Introduction 
Transnationalization of production is advancing 
rapidly, with trade and in particular foreign direct 
investment expanding much faster than produc-
tion. Within this process, transnational corpora-
tions (TNCs) are becoming more important. Both 
global output and global sales of foreign affiliates 
are growing faster than world GDP and world 
exports. Today, TNCs account for 25 % of global 
output.1 
Especially foreign direct investment (FDI) flows 
to developing countries and economies in transi-
tion have grown dramatically, increasing sixfold 
from 1990 to 1998. Their share of global FDI 
inflows rose from 18 % in the mid-1980s to 42 % 
in 1998.2 This boom is due to the fact that devel-
oping economies are growing faster on average 
than OECD economies. Moreover, since the mid-
1980s most developing countries have switched 
from import substitution to open-door policies 
towards FDI. FDI has proven to be the most stable 
source of capital, proving relatively more resilient 
in face of the recent Asian and Brazilian financial 
crisis than other private capital flows (debt and 
portfolio equity flows).3 Even if FDI inflows are 
unevenly distributed among developing countries, 
the importance of this source of capital – in terms 
of the ratio of FDI to GDP – is increasing in most 
developing countries. Even for the group of low-
income countries, which are less attractive for 
foreign investors, this ratio increased from 0.5 % 
in 1990-91 to more than 1 % in 1995.4 
FDI not only involves flows of capital but trans-
fers other important assets as well. These include 
"management and organizational expertise, tech-
nology, entrepreneurship and access to markets 
across national boundaries."5 Products, production 
processes and management techniques of TNCs 
                                                     
1 Cf. UNCTAD (1999), pp. xviii - xix.  
2 Cf. World Bank (1999), pp. 49 - 50. 
3 Cf. UNCTAD (1998), pp. 14 - 15. 
4 Cf. World Bank (1999), pp. 50 - 51. 
5 Cf. Dunning (1992), p. 5. 
are usually close to international best practices 
and improving constantly; otherwise their com-
petitiveness in international markets would not be 
sustainable. As a result, total factor productivity 
levels are higher compared to local firms in de-
veloping countries. The same applies to other 
performance criteria, such as product quality, the 
capability to generate technological innovations, 
etc.6 This productivity gap has important implica-
tions for local SMEs. TNCs should be seen as 
sources of knowledge and technologies, some of 
which may be copied or otherwise transferred to 
SMEs; on the other hand, there is always a threat 
of TNCs outcompeting local companies. 
Public policy may help to maximize the positive 
spillovers and to minimize detrimental effects of 
TNCs. Incentives and impositions aimed at guid-
ing the behavior of TNCs have therefore long 
ranked high on the industrial policy agenda of 
developing countries. Yet the dominant policy 
approach of the last decades, mainly based upon 
restrictions imposed on TNCs, such as domestic-
content and technology-licensing requirements, 
needs to be reconsidered: first, because these poli-
cies have in most cases shown disappointing re-
sults; second, because the framework conditions 
for FDI have changed, as have the prospects for 
exploiting TNC linkages and spillovers for SMEs 
in developing countries. Under the present condi-
tions of increasing globalization, competition for 
FDI is fierce, and mandatory measures may easily 
discourage TNCs from investing at all. At the 
same time, the new rules of competition are lead-
ing to a reorientation of corporate strategies. 
Many TNCs are switching from multidomestic 
organization patterns to more complex forms of 
global networking among their affiliates. As a 
consequence, they urge some of their suppliers to 
become global players, thus raising the barriers to 
entry for local SMEs. On the other hand, TNCs 
tend to specialize in certain core capabilities and 
outsource the provision of non core products and 
services, thus creating new opportunities for ancil-
lary (mostly small and medium-sized) companies.  
                                                     
6 Cf. UNCTAD (1999), pp. 198 ff. 
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To sum up, TNCs remain an important means for 
gaining access to up-to-date technologies and 
management know-how. The challenge of con-
necting up indigenous SMEs with foreign inves-
tors and speeding up technological upgrading and 
deepening of the local enterprise structure per-
sists, but new policies to that end are needed. The 
present study focuses on the preconditions for 
linkages and spillovers between TNCs and SMEs 
in developing countries as well as policy experi-
ences in this field.  
The study consists of five chapters. The first chap-
ter provides definitions of the basic concepts and 
clarifies the scope of the study. The second chap-
ter analyses the opportunities and threats that dif-
ferent types of linkages and spillovers imply for 
SMEs in developing countries. The third part pre-
sents case studies of successful TNC-SME link-
ages in three industrial activities: the electronics 
hardware, automobile, and apparel industries. 
Chapter 4 analyses the underlying determinants of 
successful TNC-SME partnerships, placing em-
phasis on the characteristics that make SMEs 
ready for partnership with TNCs and enable them 
to exploit these partnerships for technological 
learning and upgrading. In addition, the role of the 
respective TNC’s corporate strategy and support-
ing policies are discussed. Finally, Chapter 5 pre-
sents policies aimed at enhancing linkages and 
spillovers between TNCs and local SMEs. The 
chapter first gives a brief overview of general 
policies for enhancing local competition and at-
tracting TNCs; it then focuses more extensively 
on specific policies to develop and upgrade local 
SMEs by  linking them to TNCs.  
The main addressees of the study are policy-
makers, industrialists, administrators, scientists 
and intermediary institutions interested in advanc-
ing linkages and spillovers between TNCs and 
SMEs in developing countries. An earlier version 
of this paper was presented at the 10th UNCTAD 
Conference in Bangkok 2000. The author would 
like to thank UNCTAD for the permission to pub-
lish the study in the GDI Reports and Working 
Paper Series. 
1 Definitions and scope of the study  
The study discusses linkages and spillovers be-
tween transnational corporations and small and 
medium-sized enterprises in developing countries. 
In order to clarify which enterprises and which 
types of linkages and spillovers are being consid-
ered and to limit the scope of the study, the terms 
"transnational corporation," "linkage," "spillover" 
and "small and medium-sized enterprise" need to 
be defined.  
"A transnational corporation is an enterprise 
that engages in foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and owns or controls value-adding activities in 
more than one country."7 This general definition 
comprises a broad range of enterprises, which in 
turn may have very different relations with SMEs:  
– TNCs are engaged in different activities rang-
ing from production and processing of pri-
mary products to manufacturing and services;  
– They may consist of a number of largely in-
dependent multidomestic foreign subsidiaries 
or they may be part of a globally integrated 
network of affiliates performing different but 
complementary tasks including R&D, pro-
duction and marketing activities. 
– TNCs may be more or less open to incorpo-
rating host country personnel, locating strate-
gic decisions abroad, sourcing from host 
country suppliers, etc. This in turn depends 
on the corporate culture, on the degree of cul-
tural and spatial proximity between home and 
host countries, on the availability of inputs, 
the competitive pressure in the home market 
and other factors. 
– TNCs may be large global enterprises with 
many thousands of  employees worldwide, 
though some TNCs may themselves be con-
sidered SMEs, at least in their home coun-
tries, and have only a limited number of pro-
duction activities abroad. 
                                                     
7 Cf. Dunning (1992), p. 3.  
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– Most TNCs are based in OECD countries, but 
there is a clear trend towards transnationaliza-
tion of companies from developing countries. 
– TNCs have different reasons for going 
abroad. The literature usually distinguishes 
four main objectives of FDI: to seek re-
sources, to seek markets, to seek efficiency or 
to seek strategic assets and capabilities.8  
Given this heterogeneity it is obvious that the 
opportunities to link local SMEs to TNCs depend 
on characteristics of the latter, including their 
range of activities, globalization strategy, corpo-
rate culture, size, and motives for investing in 
developing countries. This study will focus on the 
typical large manufacturing TNCs with headquar-
ters in OECD countries. TNCs engaged in the 
exploitation and primary processing of natural 
resources are excluded from the study, because 
they usually have few linkages with local SMEs, 
especially in the petrochemical and mining indus-
tries.9 Some TNCs engaged in processing or ex-
porting agricultural products to source their inputs 
from small local producers, but these linkages 
with agriculture are quite different from those in 
manufacturing and services and should therefore 
be treated separately.10 
The terms "linkage" and "spillover" also need 
further specification. Some authors limit the range 
of linkages between TNCs and local companies to 
forward and backward linkages. According to 
Hirschman, forward linkages result from the utili-
zation of output,  
"i.e., every activity that does not by its 
nature cater exclusively to final de-
mands, will induce attempts to utilize its 
outputs as inputs in some new activities. 
(Conversely, backward linkages com-
                                                     
8 See for example Dunning (1992), pp. 54 ff. 
9 See for example Riveros / Vatter / Agosín (1996). 
10 See for example the extensive body of literature on 
contract farming and outgrower schemes, e.g. Glover / 
Kusterer (1990). 
prise the) attempts to supply through 
domestic production the inputs needed"11 
in a given activity. Such linkages may consist of 
arms-length transactions or different forms of 
(sometimes long-term) non market relations in-
cluding strategic alliances between firms and dif-
ferent patterns of quasi-integration. They may be 
direct or through intermediaries, for example if a 
supplier sources inputs from other local firms 
(second-tier suppliers). In addition to these for-
ward and backward linkages, there are several 
other relationships by which TNCs affect the per-
formance of local SMEs: TNCs may participate in 
different kinds of cooperative agreements with 
local firms, including strategic alliances, joint 
ventures and licensing agreements; they may in-
fluence consumer preferences and thus change 
demand patterns; SMEs may benefit from techno-
logical spillovers such as new management tech-
niques which trickle down from TNCs into the 
host economy; TNCs may introduce more aggres-
sive marketing strategies and intensify local com-
petition, forcing local competitors to reorganize. 
While this may enhance the competitiveness of 
local SMEs, the latter may also be outcompeted, 
especially if the performance gap between foreign 
and local firms is very large or if the TNC gains a 
monopolistic market position.  
This study uses a broad definition of linkages and 
spillovers, including the whole range of direct and 
indirect relationships by which the presence of 
TNCs affects the development of other firms in 
the respective host country. Five main types of 
linkages and spillovers may be distinguished:12 
– Backward linkages with suppliers. TNCs 
usually source some parts, components, indi-
rect materials and services from suppliers in 
the host economy. The effect of such linkages 
on local SMEs depends, among others things, 
on the quantity and types of inputs supplied, 
the terms of procurement, and the willingness 
of TNCs to transfer knowledge and build a 
                                                     
11 Hirschman (1958), p. 100. 
12 Cf. Dunning (1992), pp. 445 ff. 
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long-term relationship with local SMEs. Sup-
plier linkages range from arms-length market 
transactions to very close, long-term inter-
firm relations, and they may be direct or 
through intermediaries.  
– Forward linkages with customers. TNCs 
mainly develop three types of linkages with 
customers. The first and most important is 
with marketing outlets. In particular TNCs 
which outsource the distribution of brand 
name products often make considerable in-
vestments in the performance of their market-
ing outlets, e.g. restaurant chains, automobile 
or petrol companies. The second type of for-
ward linkages is with industrial buyers. TNCs 
producing machinery, equipment or other in-
puts sometimes offer after-sales services 
which go far beyond the usual advice on how 
to use and maintain the purchased good. The 
third type refers to linkages in which a TNC 
produces goods for secondary processing, 
mainly commodities, such as metal ores and 
agricultural raw materials. Commodity pro-
ducers usually exert little influence on the 
performance of secondary producers. This 
type of linkage will therefore not be discussed 
in the present study.  
– Linkages with competitors. TNC affiliates 
often face some competition from local firms, 
in some cases even from very small SMEs. 
As TNCs typically hold a strong market posi-
tion vis-à-vis local rival firms, they may have 
a strong (positive or negative) impact on the 
performance of the latter. Foreign investors 
may set new standards and create a healthy 
competition that stimulates innovations 
throughout the whole industry, but they may 
also outcompete established local firms.  
– Linkages with technology partners. Some 
TNCs initiate joint projects with indigenous 
SME partners. These projects may take vari-
ous forms of equity or non-equity linkages, 
including joint ventures, licensing agreements 
and strategic alliances. As developing 
economies grow more rapidly on average 
than industrialized economies, all these forms 
of technology partnering with firms in devel-
oping countries are becoming more and more 
common. Although inter-firm technological 
alliances are a typical phenomenon of OECD 
countries, which host most of the world’s in-
novative companies, the number of inter-firm 
technology agreements involving partners 
from developing countries is clearly rising.13 
Some host-countries require foreign investors 
to take on local partners in joint ventures or to 
license technology to local firms. In other 
cases, linkages with technology partners arise 
voluntarily, because both parties identify 
complementarities and anticipate benefits 
from partnership. Such inter-firm linkages are 
often seen as important sources of technol-
ogy.  
– Other spillover effects. These include dem-
onstration effects and human capital spill-
overs. Demonstration effects occur as TNCs 
introduce new, often more efficient ways of 
doing things, thus providing showcases for 
innovation. Local entrepreneurs may imitate 
TNC products and management techniques or 
gain access to non-traditional markets by ob-
serving and copying from TNC strategies. 
This may happen as a spontaneous, even un-
conscious process or as a planned and sys-
tematic benchmarking exercise. Human capi-
tal spillovers occur whenever TNCs train per-
sonnel beyond their own needs or if their ex-
perienced personnel moves to local firms or 
forms new spin-off companies. 
Throughout the study, several chapters will come 
back to these different types of linkages and spill-
overs, but will not always go into detail.  
– In Chapter 2 I shall discuss, from the view-
point of local SME development, opportuni-
ties and risks related to TNC-SME linkages 
and spillovers. Since all the above-mentioned 
relationships create some opportunities and 
some sort of risks for local SMEs, this chap-
ter will treat all five types. 
                                                     
13 According to the MERIT/UNCTAD database, 6.2 % of 
the 3,984 agreements recorded in the 1990s involved 
firms from developing countries, compared to 4.9 % in 
the 1980s; cf. UNCTAD (1998), p. 27. 
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– Chapter 4.1 will deal with the requirements 
SMEs have to meet in order to become part-
ners of TNCs and fully exploit the benefits of 
these relationships. This chapter will only 
treat direct (usually contractual) linkages with 
TNCs, taking into account that competing 
with TNCs or benefiting from some sort of 
other spillovers (i.e. by way of demonstration 
effects or human capital spillovers) does not 
involve any partnership with TNCs – and 
therefore no sort of barriers to entry for 
SMEs; 
– In Chapter 5.2 I shall come back to the dif-
ferent types of linkages and spillovers from a 
policy perspective. The focus of that chapter 
is on specific policies to promote linkages, 
including supplier development, promotion of 
customer relations (especially in the case of 
franchising), promotion of joint ventures and 
policies to support unspecific spillovers (es-
pecially to enhance demonstration effects). 
Linkages of TNCs with local competitors will 
not be treated in this chapter on policies, be-
cause competition policy, although undoubt-
edly very important, is a complex issue and 
not specific to the subject of this study. 
Finally, we need to define small and medium-
sized enterprises. The problem of defining SMEs 
is as old as the subject itself, and no generally 
accepted definition exists. First, different criteria 
may be applied, such as number of employees, 
paid-up capital, or turnover. Second, size catego-
ries such as "small," "medium" and "large" only 
make sense relative to a given size structure. 
Therefore, the threshold value of SMEs is quite 
low in least developed countries (e.g. 50 employ-
ees) and considerably higher in industrialized 
countries (500 employees). In some countries, 
very small firms with less than 5, 10, 15 or 20 
employees are considered as an extra-category of 
"microenterprises" beneath the stratum of SMEs.  
As the aim of the present study is to capture the 
whole range of possible linkages between TNCs 
and SMEs, we have opted for a broad definition 
comprising all firms with less than 500 employ-
ees, including microenterprises. Yet it should be 
clear that direct linkages with and spillovers from 
TNCs mainly occur with a select number of mod-
ern, medium-sized firms and a few untypical 
small firms which possess state-of-the-art tech-
nology and a professional management. TNCs are 
usually keen to build up and maintain a positive 
brand image and a reputation for high product 
quality and responsiveness. They therefore place 
much emphasis on assuring that the entire value 
chain be organized according to corporate stan-
dards. Any cooperation with local low-cost sup-
pliers that might cause quality problems or dissat-
isfaction among clients will be disregarded. Yet 
there are some cases in which even microenter-
prises are linked as low-cost first- or, more often, 
second-tier suppliers to TNCs (see Chapter 3). 
This is mainly the case in simple processes for 
low-end markets, such as assembling basic ap-
parel products. In addition, as I have argued be-
fore, even if SMEs are not directly linked to TNCs 
the latter may have decisive influence on SME 
development through demonstration effects or the 
impact of competition. This study will consider 
such indirect impacts, but emphasis will be placed 
on the more direct relations.  
2 Opportunities and risks related to 
different types of linkages and 
spillovers 
The five types of linkages presented in Chapter 1 
may have very different impacts on the develop-
ment of the host country and its indigenous SMEs.  
Backward linkages with suppliers have tradi-
tionally been seen as the main vehicle to promote 
technological spillovers from TNCs. Many devel-
oping countries have imposed domestic-content 
requirements on TNCs to intensify backward link-
ages and create local supplier industries. With 
increasing liberalization of investment rules and 
the ban on trade-related investment measures 
(TRIMs) under the GATT, such mandatory sup-
plier relations are losing importance. The chal-
lenge today is to exploit the development potential 
of supplier relations without mandatory measures.  
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Supplier relations offer the chance that a well-
balanced structure of enterprise sizes may emerge 
in which the economies of scale of large-scale 
production is ideally combined with the flexibility 
of small enterprises. SMEs can profit from this 
situation in a number of ways. The large enter-
prises, being the customers, open up new markets 
for them, often facilitate a regular receipt of pay-
ment, and relieve them of development and mar-
keting tasks. Moreover, SMEs may be given im-
portant impetuses for modernization and growth. 
Most TNCs need a broad range of competitive, 
high-quality inputs delivered on time. Since it is 
unfeasible for them to produce too many parts, 
components and services in-house, they need effi-
cient external providers of such products. There-
fore, outsourcing is increasing steadily (see 
Box 1).  
Moreover, it is preferable if these suppliers are 
close by, especially if just-in-time delivery is re-
quired. Some TNCs are therefore eager to invest in 
their local supply base by providing different 
forms of technical, managerial and organizational 
(and in some cases financial) assistance.14 As 
Dunning states,  
"the findings of a large number of studies 
over the past 30 years are virtually 
unanimous that the presence of foreign-
owned firms has helped raise the stan-
dards and productivity of many domestic 
suppliers, and that this has often had 
beneficial spillover effects on the rest of 
their operations."15 
Above all in developing countries characterized 
by polarized enterprise structures, technological 
heterogeneity and segmented goods and labor 
markets, a stronger integration of SMEs into mod-
ern supplier relations can make an important con-
tribution towards improvement of the enterprise 
structure. 
                                                     
14 See Halbach (1988), pp. 193 ff., Wong (1991). 
15 Dunning (1992), p. 456. 
Yet not all supplier relations are equally beneficial 
for SME development. In most cooperative ven-
tures it is the suppliers that depend on the cus-
tomer to a high degree. It happens quite often that 
there is a great number of suppliers and only few 
customers and that suppliers can be replaced by 
others because they lack specific capabilities. In 
such a case, the bargaining position of suppliers is 
extremely weak, and the risk is high that suppliers 
will engage in ruinous competition. The customer 
is then in a position to appropriate the major share 
of all economies resulting from specialization, 
while the suppliers have to absorb costs and risks.  
Depending on the advantages the supplier offers 
to the client, four main types of relations may be 
distinguished, each of them implying different 
opportunities for SME development. Clients may 
outsource products and services to suppliers be-
cause the latter offer:  
– Productivity gains. These are the main motive 
for outsourcing if the supplier is able to pro-
duce – all factor costs being equal – better or 
cheaper products than his customer. If the 
underlying rationale of the customer is to 
make use of technological specialization 
and/or economies of scale, the supplier has a 
relatively high autonomy over product design 
and will be responsible for improvements. 
Since the supplier produces a specialized 
complementary input for the customer, the 
latter cannot easily play one supplier off 
against another. This gives the SME partner a 
certain bargaining power. The most privi-
leged suppliers are those who achieve techno-
logical leadership in their field and are there-
fore able to negotiate high prices (innovation 
rents) for their products. In addition, the spe-
cialized supplier gains access to a reliable 
market, provided the customer remains vi-
able. Intra-industry linkages based on mutual 
specialization usually go beyond arms-length 
transactions, including the coordination of de-
livery times, product standardization, joint re-
search, and so on. These agreements guaran-
tee a long-term commitment on the part of the 
customer. They sometimes include substantial 
transfers of product as well as process tech-
nologies, such as the implementation of total 
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quality management, kaizen and eco-efficient 
production methods. 
– Factor-cost advantages: In other cases, the 
supplier has access to cheaper basic factors, 
mostly lower labor costs, e.g. due to the in-
formality of the workshop or a non-unionized 
workforce. If the TNC customer establishes a 
relationship with a supplier only to cut wage 
costs, the terms are usually far less beneficial 
for the supplier. In this case, the supplier can 
only survive if he achieves leadership on a 
cost basis. Given that the production process 
is standardized and the necessary technology 
is available to a great number of competitors, 
price competition is usually fierce, forcing 
firms to continuously cut costs. Except for 
some cases in which firms achieve extraordi-
nary increases in productivity, suppliers are 
obliged to reduce profits, wages and labor 
standards.  
– "Passive" (numerical) flexibility: Occasional 
subcontracting in the case of demand peaks 
with the aim of smoothening production usu-
ally does not provide a sound basis for SME 
development. The supplier has to accept 
short-term contracts and cushion fluctuations 
in demand by way of numerical adaptation of 
working hours. As a result, there is little sta-
bility and security for the supplier, who can 
easily lose his investments if the customer 
does not receive orders in excess of his own 
capacity. Moreover, the customer often trans-
fers the cost of inventory to the supplier. Due 
to the instability of the relationship neither 
the customer nor the supplier’s management 
will show a long-term commitment to invest 
in machinery or workforce skills. Jobs in 
these firms will be extremely insecure and 
production capacities underutilized.  
– "Active" (functional) flexibility: In some cases 
suppliers are able to respond to fluctuations in 
demand by way of functional rather than nu-
merical flexibility. This means that they can 
rapidly switch production processes and 
flexibly modify the quantity of output without 
recourse to methods of "hire and fire." Pre-
conditions for such an active flexibility are 
multi-skilled workers, programmable multi-
purpose machines and a flexible shop-floor 
organization. Under such circumstances sub-
Box 1:  Outsourcing of administrative and other business services 
As manufacturing companies increasingly concentrate on certain core-competencies, many administrative and other business 
services, which have formerly been provided in-house, are being transferred to independent providers. This applies to subcontract-
ing assembly operations, logistics and transportation, courier services, maintenance and repair of equipment, legal and labor rela-
tions consulting, accounting, industrial location services, industrial construction, quality control and sorting, among others. Due to 
the non-tradable and highly customized character of such services, many of them are subcontracted locally. Moreover, barriers to 
entry for suppliers of such services are often not as high as they are for manufacturers of parts and components.  
In 1996 the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico asked its membership which operational and administrative services they 
where outsourcing and whether they had increased outsourcing in the last five years. The survey showed a remarkable increase in 
outsourcing. 57 % of manufacturers and 27 % of service firms had begun outsourcing some operational and administrative areas in 
the last five years. The following list shows the most important services outsourced by the companies surveyed: 
Cleaning 56.7* Public Relations/ Publicity 13.3 
Systems 50.0 Health Services 13.3 
Training 40.0 Payroll 10.0 
Cafeteria 33.3 Marketing 10.0 
Maintenance 30.0 Client Service or Relations 10.0 
Accounting 26.7 Human Resources 10.0 
Collections 16.7 Others 23.3 
*  % of firms reporting to be outsourcing some service line 
Source: Cohen (1996) 
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contracting may be highly beneficial for the 
supplier, even though demand is unstable.  
TNC customers tend towards stable, long-term 
relations with a limited number of reliable me-
dium-sized suppliers. Unstable supplier relations 
are usually not compatible with rising standards as 
regards quality and reliability. Good manufactur-
ing practices, sometimes even certification ac-
cording to ISO standards, are gaining in impor-
tance, which in turn presupposes a skilled and 
highly motivated workforce along the entire value 
chain. This implies increasing barriers to entry for 
potential SME candidates, though it on the other 
hand improves working conditions and opportuni-
ties for technological upgrading within a select 
group of SME suppliers.  
Market-seeking foreign affiliates tend to have 
more intensive supplier relations in their host 
countries than export-oriented affiliates. This is 
mainly due to two facts: first, barriers to entry for 
suppliers are lower in domestic markets in devel-
oping countries, since these require fewer econo-
mies of scale and as a rule lower quality stan-
dards; second, host governments used to impose 
domestic-content requirements, forcing foreign 
investors to source locally. In the case of export-
oriented activities, investors are usually free to 
choose their suppliers, since forcing them to 
source from less efficient local suppliers would 
erode their export performance. As a result, sup-
pliers to export-oriented TNC affiliates are usually 
far fewer in number but considerably more effi-
cient. Trade and investment liberalization and the 
TRIMs agreement tend to replace noncompetitive 
local suppliers by imports or follow investments 
of transnational suppliers. 
Forward linkages with customers: Forward 
linkages between TNCs and SMEs may also cre-
ate important opportunities for the development of 
local enterprises. First of all, local SMEs will 
always benefit if a good or service produced by a 
foreign investor lowers the price or improves the 
quality of an input that the respective SME uses 
further upstream in the production process. Below 
I shall discuss the issue of technology transfer 
from TNCs to their customers. In this sense, the 
most important forward linkages are with market-
ing outlets and industrial buyers.  
As regards marketing outlets, TNCs increasingly 
concentrate on their core capabilities in certain 
stages of the value chain. Core capabilities of 
many TNCs are in the area of design and devel-
opment of a brand name, or in manufacturing. 
Concentrating on what the company masters best 
leads to outsourcing of many other, non-core, 
activities. Distributional and after-sales services 
are among the activities most frequently trans-
ferred to independent companies. Examples of 
independent marketing outlets linked to transna-
tional brand-name corporations are automobile 
dealers, gas stations, restaurant chains, travel 
agencies, drugstores, and courier services. Out-
sourcing these activities implies considerable ad-
vantages for the brand-name company, mainly 
that it may rapidly cover extensive markets while 
minimizing risks and investment in distribution 
channels. On the other hand, TNCs are obviously 
keen to maintain high and homogeneous standards 
in their downstream activities, taking into account 
the fact that the distributors are active at the inter-
face with the consumer and thus have a strong 
impact on the TNC’s (brand-name) reputation. 
TNCs therefore often opt for outsourcing plus 
providing comprehensive training for their dis-
tributors. The SME distributor thus benefits from 
the use of an established brand name, a proven 
business concept and the transfer of knowledge 
from the TNC. This greatly reduces the risk of 
failure for the local SME. The main disadvantages 
of such linkages consist in the fact that the local 
marketing partner remains highly dependent on 
the TNC. In some cases, furthermore, the local 
SME is forced to pay substantial fees and royalties 
for using the partner’s brand name and business 
concept.  
The most important and rapidly expanding 
mechanism for downstream relationships with 
local SMEs is franchising. Franchising  
"is a way of doing business whereby the 
owner of a proven business system (the 
franchiser) grants the right by contract 
to an entrepreneur (the franchisee) to es-
tablish a similar business. In exchange 
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for franchise fees and the obligation to 
adhere to strict quality standards, the 
franchisee acquires the right to use the 
franchiser’s trademark and receives 
marketing support, detailed manuals on 
how to operate the business, start-up as-
sistance, staff training, equipment, raw 
material procurement, and regular visits 
by a representative of the franchiser."16  
This definition enumerates a multiplicity of ways 
by which the franchiser transfers knowledge and 
other benefits to the SME partner. Franchising is 
thus an attractive way of combining the advan-
tages of small firms with those of a homogeneous 
brand-name presentation with guaranteed quality 
and support features. As economic liberalization 
advances in developing countries, local brands 
and traditional ways of doing business are increas-
ingly coming under pressure from more competi-
tive international (often even global) products and 
business concepts. In many activities – fast-food 
restaurants, drugstores and hotels, among others – 
local competitors find it increasingly difficult to 
compete with international chains. Under such 
circumstances franchising is often the only possi-
bility to stay in business. Today franchising is 
rapidly expanding in both industrialized and de-
veloping countries. In the United States franchis-
ing represents more than 40 % of all retail sales, 
and this number is expected to grow to 50 % by 
the end of the century. The U.S. is the trend-setter 
in this business. While in the rest of the world 
franchising has not yet developed to the same 
degree, many countries display similar growth 
rates. In Brazil for example, the number of fran-
chisees increased during the 1990s from 5,000 to 
24,000.17 
Box 2 illustrates the advantages and disadvantages 
of franchising for both partners. 
Thanks to the use of proven business systems, the 
probability of failure is much lower in franchising 
than in independent start-up enterprises. Accord-
                                                     
16 Henriques / Nelson (1997), p. 23. 
17 Nachrichten für den Aussenhandel, 6.4.1999. 
ing to the U.S. Department of Commerce, less 
than five percent of franchise outlets have failed 
or been discontinued per year since 1971. In com-
parison, almost two-thirds of all independent, non-
franchised business start-ups are discontinued in 
the first five years.18 A study conducted in Brazil 
revealed that in 1993 and 1994 the annual closing 
rate of franchise businesses was as low as 2.3 %.19 
The franchise system does not only offer an op-
portunity to establish new SMEs as dependent 
franchisees. Local entrepreneurs may also copy 
the franchise system itself. They may imitate ei-
ther the products or the way of doing business of 
successful transnational franchisers.  
"In Singapore, even the hawkers at pub-
lic food centers and coffee shops have 
started to sell western fast foods, copying 
the products of these franchise busi-
nesses. (...) Some hawker entrepreneurs 
have even adopted the methods of these 
franchises by franchising their hawker 
stores."20  
In most large developing countries such indige-
nous franchises are gaining importance, especially 
in retail services. In Malaysia, for example, local 
franchises are spreading in activities as diverse as 
food products, automobile repair, jewelry, private 
computer academies, fitness studios, and drug-
stores. The Big Seven convenience store chain in 
Thailand and the Econ-Minimart chain in Singa-
pore are examples of quite large indigenous fran-
chises. Another important mechanism of down-
stream technology transfer from TNCs to SMEs is 
advice for industrial buyers. Many transnational 
producers of machinery, equipment or intermedi-
ate goods provide assistance to their customers, 
which may be SMEs in developing countries. 
Most commonly, they send specialized personnel 
to train the customers workforce on how to use 
the acquired machinery or equipment and provide 
repair services; but in many cases the transfer of 
                                                     
18 See http://www.franchisedevelopers.com/facts.htm.  
19 Nachrichten für den Aussenhandel, 6.4.1999. 
20 Chong / Goh (1997), p. 52. 
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knowledge goes much further, providing informa-
tion on international quality standards and market 
trends, helping to match with potential customers, 
etc. For example, producers of knitwear machin-
ery proved to be important sources of information 
about knitwear design and market trends in export 
markets.21 Such advice pays off for the TNC be-
                                                     
21 Cf. Vangstrup (1999).  
cause machinery and intermediate goods may only 
be sold if the customer in turn manages to im-
prove his own sales. Moreover, technical assis-
tance helps to tie the customer to the provider of 
machinery.  
Linkages with competitors: Competition is the 
main driving force for technological learning. 
TNCs entering a developing country’s market 
may induce competing local companies to accel-
Box 2:  Potential advantages and disadvantages of franchising 
 For the franchiser For the franchisee 
Advantages – Rapid expansion of business. 
– Business growth facilitated through capital 
inputs from the franchisee. 
– Financial and manpower resources provided 
by the franchisee. 
– Few permanent staff required by franchiser. 
– Broader and more rapid market coverage by 
the franchise. 
– Bulk purchasing of inputs is greater because 
of financial inputs of franchisee. 
– Involvement in day-to-day operations of 
business outlets are limited to monitoring.  
– Capital risks are shifted to the franchisee. 
– Use of a proven business system. 
– Business risks greatly reduced because franchise 
has proven track record. 
– New product development and quick response to 
competition by franchiser. 
– Can devote full attention to day-to-day operations. 
– Provision for staff training and continuous support 
from franchiser staff. 
– Requires less capital than an independent business. 
– Benefits from franchiser advertising, brand name, 
and promotions. 
– Bulk purchasing and negotiating power of fran-
chiser.  
– Easier access to bank loans and start-up capital. 
Disadvantages – Constant monitoring of quality required to 
maintain franchise reputation, conformity and 
integrity. 
– The franchise is a complex business system to 
manage. 
– Long-term relations with franchisees may be 
difficult to maintain. 
– Fees based on franchise income may be 
misrepresented (understated). 
– There is usually strict adherence to quality stan-
dards 
– Initial financial inputs and continuing royalty fee 
may be substantial. 
– Previous business success record of franchiser may 
be difficult to assess. 
– Detailed contractual arrangement may restrict 
creativeness of franchisee. 
– Sale or transfer of the franchise may be highly 
restricted. 
– Dependence on franchiser and franchise name. 
– Franchiser policies may adversely affect franchisee 
operations.  
– Franchise may have a limited product line. 
– Franchiser may lack initiative and flexibility in 
reacting to local market changes. 
– Franchisee position is usually weak relative to 
franchiser.  
Source: Henriques / Nelson (1997: 25) 
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erate improvements. On the other hand, if the 
local competitors are lagging far behind TNC 
standards, FDI may drive these firms out of the 
market. This (as well as acquisition of local com-
petitors) leads to oligopolistic market power and 
may hinder endogenous technological develop-
ment. In such a non-competitive environment 
TNCs can quite often secure their market position 
without making efforts to  continuously improve 
their performance. Moreover, lack of competition 
may lead to adverse political-economy effects. 
Such adverse effects have been shown for TNCs 
especially during the era of import substitution in 
small countries. Conversely, if local companies 
are able to compete seriously with the TNC affili-
ates, the latter are forced to bring in new tech-
nologies to restore their advantages. Using the 
example of Mexico, Blomström, Kokko and Ze-
jan22 show that there is a statistically relevant 
positive correlation between the technology im-
ports of TNCs and the local competitor’s invest-
ment and output growth. The ability of potential 
local rivals to survive the competitive pressure of 
TNCs and respond with improved performance 
depends on several factors, such as the techno-
logical gap between TNCs and local firms, the 
entrepreneurial ethos of the latter, policy support 
available to them, size and structure of the local 
market, and the aggressiveness of TNCs, among 
other things. 
Linkages with technology partners: In principle, 
linkages with technology partners, such as corpo-
rate joint ventures, technology licensing and other 
forms of inter-firm alliances, should offer advan-
tages to all the firms involved. From the point of 
view of SMEs in developing countries they are 
mainly seen as mechanisms to gain access to new 
fields of knowledge and technology. Yet such 
alliances are always fraught with difficulties, es-
pecially in cases of very unequal partnerships, 
such as TNCs on the one side of the relationship 
and developing country SMEs on the other. Prob-
lems mainly arise from the fact that both partners 
pursue different and often conflicting goals, so 
that the distribution of benefits requires complex 
                                                     
22 Cf. Blomström / Kokko / Zejan (1994). 
and continuing bargaining. If information and 
bargaining power are unevenly distributed among 
the partners, the benefits of the weaker partner 
(usually the local SME) are likely to be limited, 
and the outcome of the alliance may even be 
negative.23 This is clearly demonstrated by the 
fact that such alliances, especially joint ventures, 
have a reputation for instability.24  
Table 1 lists the major contributions local and 
foreign companies make to joint ventures. It 
shows the different motives and benefits for both 
sides. From the above table we may infer that 
local partners mainly form joint ventures with 
foreign companies with an eye to gaining access 
to technological and management know-how as 
well as to taking advantage of the foreign part-
ner’s international reputation. Moreover, partner-
ship may limit their financial exposure. The latter 
also holds true for the foreign partners, who are 
eager to share costs and financial risks especially 
in the first years of operation in a new, unfamiliar 
market, taking into account the fact that such 
markets often involve high (real or perceived) 
risks. Besides finance, the main advantages of 
taking up a local partner are related to familiarity 
with the local way of doing business, including 
the political and institutional dimensions (access 
to political decision-taking,25 familiarity with 
regulations and customs) as well as knowledge of 
and access to markets. 
These different expectations often lead to con-
flicts. Local partners will try to gain as much ac-
cess as possible to specific knowledge and tech-
nology of their foreign counterparts, yet these 
assets are at the core of competitive advantages of 
any company, especially in case of rapidly devel-
oping, knowledge-intensive activities. Therefore it 
is clear that the technologically more advanced 
                                                     
23 Cf. Barba Navaretti (1991), p. 26. 
24 Cf. Miller et al. (1996). 
25 In 1998 the author conducted a series of interviews with 
TNC affiliates in Malaysia. In these interviews, several 
managers stressed the importance of having a local part-
ner for gaining access to public procurement and incen-
tives.  
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partners will try to avoid any leakage of specific 
knowledge which is relevant to their market posi-
tion. Therefore joint ventures often receive less 
technological input from TNC parent companies 
than wholly owned subsidiaries.26 On the other 
hand, TNCs need local partners if the latter pro-
vide access to local politics, institutions, and mar-
kets. Such advantages are usually easier to acquire 
than technological core competences. An IFC 
study accordingly concludes that  
"it is not sufficient for firms to depend on 
their intimate knowledge of government 
affairs or familiarity with local financial 
markets for continuing relevance in the 
JV, since these contributions are bound 
to erode. More substantive advantages 
are required: control of distribution 
channels, access to continuing sources of 
technology, control of export channels, 
etc." 27 
As a matter of fact, Moran cites two studies which 
show how Japanese foreign investors sought joint 
ventures for local expertise and political cover 
while they were expanding into new markets, but 
took full control of their subsidiaries once they 
had settled in.28  
                                                     
26 Cf. Reuber et al. (1973), pp. 185 ff. 
27 Miller et al. (1996). 
28 Cf. Moran (1999), p. 120. 
To sum up, joint ventures as well as other techno-
logical partnering may be exploited for local SME 
development, but such alliances remain fragile 
and risky. The success of local partners is highly 
dependent on their ability  
– to bargain before entering an alliance and 
continuously renegotiate the conditions 
throughout the ongoing cooperation; and  
– to upgrade technologically and sustain advan-
tages which make them irreplaceable for the 
foreign partner.  
Other spillover effects: TNCs sometimes transfer 
know-how to local SMEs which are not directly 
linked to them as suppliers. This may happen as 
consciously planned efforts or in the form of unin-
tended spillovers. Two indirect spillovers are es-
pecially important, namely demonstration effects 
and effects by way of turnover of skilled person-
nel.  
Demonstration effects occur as TNCs introduce 
new market channels, technologies, management 
techniques and ways of inter-firm division of la-
bor, and local companies observe these innova-
tions in order to copy or adapt them to their own 
needs. Demonstration effects thus help the local 
business community 
– to gain access to new export markets. TNCs 
often open up new export markets and thus 
prepare the field for local followers. The lat-
ter may benefit from the reputation the pio-
neering exporters have built up for local 
products and from established trade channels. 
Table 1: IFC survey of joint ventures. Major contributions made by local and foreign companies 
Major local partner contributions Major foreign partner contributions 
Knowledge of local politics 70 % Process technology 74 % 
Knowledge of government regulations 68 % Product technology 72 % 
Knowledge of local customs 68 % International reputation 70 % 
Knowledge of local markets 65 % Provision of finance 65 % 
Provision of financing 58 % Management know-how 59 % 
Local reputation 58 %   
Access to local market 54 %   
*Percentage in JV sample where category was specified. Respondents could specify more than one category. 
Source: Miller et al. (1996) 
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Mexico is a good example. After the NAFTA 
agreement had been signed in 1994, several 
manufacturing branches radically reoriented 
their production from supplying the domestic 
market to an export strategy towards the US 
market. In the first few years exports were 
highly concentrated in a small number of 
companies, among them many TNCs. Yet in 
subsequent years the number of exporters in-
creased rapidly, involving a growing number 
of local SMEs.29 In Guatemala, apparel ex-
ports started with experienced Korean inves-
tors. Later on, some 90 local companies cop-
ied their way of doing business and are now 
independent exporters.30 Rhee and Belot give 
additional examples from other low-income 
countries;31 
– to introduce new management techniques. 
Since management techniques in many de-
veloping countries need substantial upgrad-
ing, the role of TNCs as showcases is espe-
cially relevant in this field. New concepts of 
industrial organization are often developed by 
TNCs which later become role models of 
business organization worldwide. Some of 
the dominant management paradigms of the 
last decades are even named after the pioneer-
ing TNCs (e.g. Fordism, Toyotism). Many 
important management concepts and tools, 
such as kaizen or Total Quality Management, 
also go back to TNCs and have subsequently 
been adapted to the needs of SMEs. In Cen-
tral America, for example, foreign investors 
introduced improved techniques of plant lay-
out and logistics which have subsequently 
been copied by their local subcontractors.32 
As we shall see in Chapter 5.4.4, TNCs are 
much more willing to transfer knowledge 
about management techniques than know-
how about production technologies. This is so 
because management techniques are usually 
                                                     
29 Cf. INEGI database. 
30 Cf. Altenburg (1999), p. 20. 
31 Cf. Rhee / Belot (1990). 
32 Based on a survey of 35 investors in Free Production 
Zones in Costa Rica conducted by the author in 1993. 
not specific to a certain industrial activity and 
thus not considered core capabilities, while 
the leakage of specific production technolo-
gies may jeopardize the possibility to gain in-
novation rents;  
– to develop new ways of inter-firm division of 
labor. As I mentioned earlier, modern indus-
trial organization is characterized by concen-
tration on core capabilities and increasing 
specialization among firms. Outsourcing of 
non-core capabilities and new forms of inter-
firm alliances, such as research alliances, 
technology licensing and franchising, are rap-
idly gaining importance. Yet specialization in 
certain stages of the value chain and coopera-
tion with complementary firms are still much 
less frequent in developing countries than in 
industrialized countries. Foreign investors in 
developing countries therefore often transmit 
new ways of inter-firm division of labor. As 
an example, American companies introduced 
the concept of franchising in Singapore, 
which was subsequently copied and/or 
adapted by local companies developing their 
own franchises.33  
Although most of these transfers occur without 
active involvement of the TNC and rather through 
copying of ideas, the last years have witnessed 
more conscious and systematically organized 
processes aimed at exploiting demonstration ef-
fects, e.g. company visits and benchmarking pro-
grams. 
Spillover effects by way of turnover of skilled per-
sonnel may provide indigenous SMEs with ex-
perienced workers, technicians and management 
personnel and lead to the formation of new spin-
off companies. As TNCs usually have more ad-
vanced equipment, more up-to-date production 
processes and management techniques as well as 
higher quality standards than local companies, 
they place higher demands on their workforce and 
usually have to invest more in training. With new 
management techniques emphasizing total quality 
(including technical aspects – such as statistical 
                                                     
33 Chong / Goh (1997), p. 52. 
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process control, continuos improvement, trace-
ability of batches – as well as the propagation of 
work ethics, quality awareness and corporate 
identity), and with increasing sophistication of 
many TNC operations in developing countries, 
human capital investment becomes more impor-
tant. Most TNC affiliates in developing countries 
therefore offer regular training courses ranging 
from basic courses on motivation and prevention 
of accidents to more specialized training with 
respect to quality management, operation and 
maintenance of modern equipment, logistics, etc. 
Specialized workers sometimes are given training 
in the parent companies or other TNC affiliates 
abroad where they can apply new techniques, 
experience different business cultures and learn 
foreign languages. Even if TNC employees do not 
participate in training activities, they may acquire 
certain skills, attitudes and ideas just by working 
in a plant that conforms to international produc-
tion standards, e.g. on compliance with quality 
standards, work organization and plant layout. 
Some TNCs are thus "invisible colleges" which 
make substantial contributions to skill formation 
in the host country.34  
Moreover, experienced TNC personnel may quit 
their jobs in the company in order to use the ac-
quired technical or management skills to set up 
independent local companies (spin-offs). Accord-
ing to the author’s interviews in Malaysia, TNCs 
often keep up good relations with spin-off compa-
nies, although they rarely encourage experienced 
personnel to leave and set up independent firms. 
Many of the successful electronics suppliers and 
subcontractors in Penang, Malaysia, have been 
formed by experienced staff from TNCs (see 
Chapter 3.1). 
                                                     
34 E.g. Best (1999), p. 25 for the case of Malaysia.  
3 Case studies of successful TNC-SME 
linkages  
Below three case studies of different manufactur-
ing activities are presented: the electronics hard-
ware, automotive, and apparel industries. The first 
two sectors are among the most promising for 
supplier development and technological spillovers 
because they need a broad range of technologi-
cally more or less complex inputs. As producers 
of end-products move away from vertical integra-
tion, suppliers contribute an increasing share of 
value added. Moreover, both industries are char-
acterized by high rates of innovation and are 
therefore continuously restructuring their patterns 
of industrial organization, including their relations 
with suppliers. The apparel industry is a tradi-
tional labor-intensive low-tech industry in which 
leading companies have long concentrated on 
design and marketing, while the labor-intensive 
process of assembling is outsourced. 
3.1 The electronics hardware industry 
The electronics hardware industry is one of the 
most dynamic manufacturing industries in devel-
oping countries and is supposed to be one of the 
most promising for spillovers. In many Southeast 
and East Asian countries, manufacturing of elec-
tronics is the leading industrial sector in terms of 
investment, industrial output, value added, exports 
and employment. The industry is largely domi-
nated by TNCs. Recently, developing countries 
outside Asia have been gaining importance as 
preferential investment sites for electronics TNCs, 
e.g. Mexico, Costa Rica and Hungary. The elec-
tronics hardware industry consists of three subsec-
tors: consumer electronics, office automation 
equipment and industrial electronics, and elec-
tronic components. Each of these subsectors re-
quires some simple assembly, testing and packag-
ing operations which may be performed by an 
unskilled workforce. Traditionally, these simple 
processes were the main activities to be trans-
ferred to developing countries. Yet during the last 
years, electronics TNCs have increasingly concen-
trated on developing, designing and marketing 
their products. They therefore prefer to outsource 
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manufacturing. This opened important windows 
of opportunity for subcontractors, who have be-
come experts in assembling standardized prod-
ucts. Moreover, as automation increases, electron-
ics TNCs demand more specialized tooling such 
as jigs and fixtures for automated assembly. This 
is another niche market for supporting SMEs. 
Below three case studies of leading agglomera-
tions of TNC-driven electronics production for 
global markets are presented. The three industrial 
cases represent different stages in the develop-
ment from a mere factor-cost based agglomeration 
of assembly plants to a knowledge-based indus-
trial cluster with a vibrant development of com-
plementary SMEs. Guadalajara is the most recent 
agglomeration where up to now no supporting 
local companies have emerged; Penang is a more 
mature production site with a considerable dy-
namics of local supplier and skills development, 
but still very limited innovative capabilities. Fi-
nally, Singapore has upgraded from a simple as-
sembly site to a dynamic cluster spinning off in-
novative SMEs and developing world-class sup-
pliers. 
Guadalajara, Mexico.35 Guadalajara, Mexico’s 
second largest city, is a rapidly growing agglom-
eration of export-oriented TNCs in the electronics 
industry. The cluster started with a large IBM 
investment in a computer assembly plant in 1985. 
As IBM performed well, several leading electron-
ics TNCs followed IBM and set up their own as-
sembly plants, among them Hewlett Packard, 
NEC, Compaq, Phillips, Motorola, Intel, Siemens 
and Ericsson. These companies are using the rela-
tively cheap Mexican labor force for assembly 
and testing of electronic devices including PCs, 
laptops, printers, hard disks, floppy disks, tele-
phones and cellular phones, beepers etc. Some of 
these operations are highly automated and require 
comparatively skilled labor. Yet R&D is carried 
out exclusively in the parent plant, and local inno-
vations are limited to minimal incremental im-
                                                     
35 Based on Hartmann (1998), Dussel (1999) and own 
interviews conducted in 1997. 
provements concerning, for instance, human re-
source management or plant layout.  
In the second half of the 1990s, the number of 
companies and volume of output had reached the 
critical mass where it made sense for some lead-
ing global suppliers of electronic components and 
specialized contract manufacturers to follow the 
assembling industry to Guadalajara. As a result, a 
new round of foreign investment started. Among 
the large ancillary industries to invest in Guadala-
jara were Solectron, SCI Systems, Flextronics, 
NatSteel Electronics, Universal Scientific Indus-
trial Co., etc. Some of these companies produce 
inputs for the above mentioned TNCs, such as 
computer motherboards, disk drives and plastic 
casings, while others provide assembly services 
for brand-name corporations. At the end of 1997, 
electronics transnationals in Guadalajara em-
ployed some 30,000 persons directly and claimed 
to generate employment of 100,000 altogether. At 
that time, one new foreign investor was expected 
to arrive per month.  
What is striking is the almost complete absence of 
local suppliers, although the local government and 
business associations have set up a Supplier De-
velopment Program with substantial financial 
contributions from TNCs. The only exceptions are 
some minority equity shares in joint ventures pro-
ducing simple PCBs and injection plastic prod-
ucts, an assembly plant and a few SMEs providing 
packaging materials (plastic bags, cardboard 
boxes and rubber foam) and printed manuals. On 
the contrary, in some cases local companies have 
been replaced, for example a local producer of 
plastic casings. A large national company produc-
ing cables and harnesses for the electronics indus-
try has been taken over by foreign investors.  
Penang, Malaysia.36 Penang’s industrialization 
began in the early 1970s, when the first TNCs set 
up semiconductor assembly plants there. At that 
time, Penang’s attractiveness resulted almost ex-
clusively from the cheap, trainable and English-
                                                     
36 Based on O’Connor (1993), Rasiah (1994, 1998a,b), 
Best (1999) and own interviews conducted in 1998. 
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speaking labor force. As the first investors were 
successful, the number of foreign investors rose 
steadily. In 1996 the manufacturing workforce 
had nearly reached 200,000, the electronics indus-
try with its roughly 90,000 persons being the most 
important employer. Today, most global players 
in the electronics hardware market are operating 
in Penang.  
Until the mid-1980s, foreign investors did not 
develop substantial linkages with local SMEs. At 
that time, the industry experienced major changes. 
First, technological innovations made it possible 
to advance the automation of assembly and test-
ing; second, project cycles shortened considera-
bly, and the market demanded shorter product 
life-cycles, smaller batches, and more customized 
products. Under these conditions, electronics 
TNC’s delegated more responsibilities to their 
foreign affiliates. Although usually basic innova-
tions and pilot lines for serial production contin-
ued to be developed in the respective home coun-
tries, the parent plants often did not engage in 
high-volume manufacturing. As incremental in-
novations within the process of high-volume 
manufacturing became more important, there was 
more and more scope for developing expertise 
within the subsidiary plant. In addition, TNCs 
needed a quicker and more flexible supply. Ac-
cordingly, demand increased for a variety of spe-
cialized machine tools, plastic products and pack-
aging materials. At the same time, the locational 
advantage of being close to the assembly plant 
gained importance. During the first years, TNCs 
tried to produce the necessary tools in-house or to 
induce foreign suppliers to set up production 
plants in Penang. Yet it proved more efficient to 
develop local suppliers. In four areas, the devel-
opment of local SMEs has been extraordinary:  
– Metal stamping and precision tooling, includ-
ing jigs, fixtures, dies and moulds (e.g. for in-
jecting epoxy resin). Some suppliers offer 
high-precision tooling and produce complex 
machines, such as automatic die-bonders. 
Among the most dynamic firms are Eng 
Teknologi, LKT Industrial Bhd. and Semi-
conductor Equipment Manufacturers. These 
leading suppliers in turn outsource some sim-
ple processes, such as metal stamping, to 
small local workshops; 
– Contract manufacturing for assembly opera-
tions. Some local companies acquired exper-
tise regarding logistics, plant layout, human 
resources management and other areas which 
are crucial for cost-effective assembly. TNCs 
therefore increasingly outsource standard as-
sembly operations. Examples of successful 
contract manufacturers are Globetronics and 
Samatech; 
– Production of plastic materials. These include 
direct inputs such as casings for PCs. Sanda 
Plastics is a leading local supplier; 
– Packaging materials. Several local companies 
have specialized in cardboard boxes, foam 
packaging materials, plastics bags, etc.  
Most of these SMEs emerged as spin-offs from 
U.S. transnationals. Electronics TNCs invested in 
modern in-house machine shops which became an 
important "school" for Malaysian engineers. Some 
of these engineers later set up local machine-tool 
companies with the aim of supplying their former 
employers. Rasiah has shown that Intel and Na-
tional Semiconductor have been the seedbed for 
some of the most successful local machine-tool 
suppliers. A few suppliers grew from traditional 
backyard enterprises. In all cases, the TNC cus-
tomers allowed their suppliers to grow step by 
step. Suppliers were initially given small contracts 
in order to test their capabilities and commitment. 
Upon successful completion of the initial contract, 
larger consecutive contracts followed. This en-
abled local firms to make incremental investments 
in the necessary CNC machines. 
Singapore. Singapore’s electronics industry 
started with simple assembly and testing opera-
tions similar to those in Guadalajara and Penang. 
Yet technological progress in the city-state’s in-
dustry has gone much further than in the two other 
locations. While Guadalajara and Penang still rely 
on semi-skilled, labor-intensive operations, TNC 
operations in Singapore  
"focused increasingly on more engineer-
ing intensive activities, including auto-
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mation, product redesign, design for 
manufacture, and logistics functions as-
sociated with regional procurement in-
cluding complementary business, logis-
tics, procurement and financial services. 
(...) The transformation did not stop with 
a re-division of activities within Macs. 
(...) Singapore’s electronics industry was 
strategically converted from a labor-
intensive manufacturing operations plat-
form for vertically integrated MNCs to a 
horizontally integrated manufacturing 
services cluster with ever increasing de-
velopment of manufacturing-complemen-
tary service activities such as engineer-
ing-intensive product redesign and proc-
ess automation and complementary busi-
ness services associated with regional 
coordination, procurement, development, 
and integration activities"37 
As a result, the value added per person in the elec-
tronics industry is 63,000 US $ in Singapore ver-
sus 12,000 in Penang.38 Transnationalization of 
Singaporean electronics companies is another sign 
of increasing international competitiveness. More 
and more local suppliers and subcontractors are 
investing abroad. Component producer NatSteel 
Electronics for example, a spin-off from the gov-
ernment-controlled steel company NatSteel, has 
opened plants in Guadalajara and Penang as well 
as in Hungary, China, Indonesia, and Thailand. 
The Mexican plant alone employs 2,750 people. 
Another component company, JIT Holdings, is 
building factories in Guadalajara and Hungary, 
while a plastics company from Singapore will set 
up shop inside NatSteel’s Mexican factory to 
make computer cases.39 
The three agglomerations of electronics compa-
nies started as greenfield sites for assembly and 
testing of electronic products, and in the begin-
ning, none of them had much more to offer than a 
                                                     
37 Best (1999), p. 8. 
38 Ibid, p. 9. 
39 Cf. Far Eastern Economic Review, November 11, 1999. 
cheap and trainable workforce. Yet today the de-
gree of local linkages and spillovers differs con-
siderably. How can this difference be explained? 
Although there is no simple answer to this ques-
tion, some important factors are obvious: 
– The period of time since the FDI reached a 
critical mass. Local companies need some 
time to develop specific skills. Singapore was 
the first of the three electronics locations to 
develop. Investment in Penang began in the 
early 1970s, but the critical mass for vigorous 
supplier development was not reached until 
the early 1980s. Local supplier development 
took off about 1985, triggered by new sourc-
ing strategies of the TNCs. Guadalajara’s dy-
namic development as a TNC location for 
electronics only started in the mid 1990s. 
Thus far, local suppliers have therefore had 
little time to develop; 
– The historical situation in which the location 
was integrated into the international division 
of labor. It may be assumed that the first 
movers in the electronics business (such as 
Singapore and Taiwan) had more opportuni-
ties for developing local suppliers than late-
comers. Entry barriers were lower because 
production was technologically less sophisti-
cated, less automated and required less capital 
and economies of scale; 
– The formation of engineering and technical 
skills. As early as in the 1960s Singapore’s 
educational system focused on engineering 
and technical skills. The training system was 
continuously upgraded in line with progress 
in the electronics industry. Singapore’s "strat-
egy was not R&D or design-led but based on 
upgrading manufacturing capabilities in 
synch with the engineering and technical skill 
base."40 This provided a rich pool of engi-
neering expertise for both technologically 
demanding TNCs and local SMEs in com-
plementary activities. In Penang and Guada-
lajara highly skilled engineers are in short 
supply, although in Malaysia the Penang 
Skills Development Centre has recently been 
                                                     
40 Cf. Best (1999), p. 9. 
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making important contributions to overcome 
this bottleneck;41 
– Supplier development policy. Singapore 
started quite early to pursue an active and tar-
geted picking-the-winners strategy to foster 
promising local companies (Local Industry 
Upgrading Programme).42 Supplier develop-
ment is closely coordinated with TNC cus-
tomers. In the other two locations, the strate-
gic focus on developing and upgrading local 
suppliers is less visible.  
3.2 The automobile industry  
In many large developing countries the automo-
bile industry represents a significant portion of the 
overall manufacturing activity in terms of output 
and employment. In addition to this direct contri-
bution, the industry is considered important to 
economic development because of its strong 
backward linkages and its large share in the con-
sumption of selected inputs, such as iron and steel 
products, aluminum alloys, etc.43 The size of the 
automobile industry in developing countries is the 
result of several decades of protectionist policies, 
in most cases aimed at developing domestic SMEs 
into viable suppliers of transnational assembly 
plants. Today, economic liberalization and the 
ongoing consolidation of the global automobile 
industry are challenging the future development of 
carmakers and supplier industries in developing 
countries. In order to be able to assess their devel-
opment prospects it is necessary to take a look at 
some global industry trends. 
In the last decades, the global automobile industry 
has been undergoing profound structural change. 
The whole industry is consolidating through 
mergers, acquisitions and strategic alliances. 
Many of the smaller and medium-sized car manu-
facturers, such as Rover, Saab, Skoda and Seat, 
have already been taken over, and probably many 
                                                     
41 Cf. Rasiah (1998b). 
42 See Battat / Frank / Shen (1996), pp. 28 f. 
43 www.ifc.org/ifc/FIAS/pubs/fdinewsv1n1/index.html. 
others, even of the size of Volvo and BMW, are 
likely to follow. Within a few years, the global 
market will be dominated by a small number of 
very large firms and alliances. What is driving this 
trend is the need to achieve economies of scale in 
research, manufacturing and advertising. Using 
standard platforms and sharing parts among dif-
ferent brands, large global consortia can lower 
unit production costs and still offer a considerable 
variety of models.  
As part of this consolidation of the car industry, 
the structure of the supplier industries also needed 
a complete overhaul. The production of a vehicle 
involves a large number of independent firms 
producing parts and components or providing the 
principle carmaker with engineering and other 
services. The general trend is to outsource ever 
more processes to independent producers, thus 
reducing the principle carmaker’s share in value 
added. Direct suppliers in turn generally buy from 
or subcontract processes to other companies, thus 
giving rise to a pyramid structure with up to five 
tiers of direct and indirect suppliers. The average 
Japanese carmaker’s production system, for in-
stance, is said to comprise 170 first-tier, 4,700 
second-tier, and 31,600 lower-tier suppliers.44 
Since the 1980s, automobile companies have been 
reducing the number of direct suppliers, while at 
the same time assigning them more competences. 
Some of the most important suppliers in this way 
became systems suppliers, assuming the responsi-
bility for the integral production of complex parts 
of the vehicle (e.g. the front-end), which requires 
coordination among numerous individual produc-
ers of parts and components. The systems suppli-
ers in particular cooperate intensively with the 
automobile companies: 
– In order to shorten product cycles, research 
and product development need to be closely 
coordinated between carmakers and systems 
suppliers (simultaneous engineering). 
– As carmakers seek to reduce their cost of 
inventory, they try to achieve just-in-time de-
livery, i.e. they want their suppliers to pro-
                                                     
44 Cf. Hill (1989), p. 466. 
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duce and deliver exactly the quantity of parts 
and components immediately needed in the 
production process. This requires a sophisti-
cated and highly reliable procurement logis-
tics. 
– As quality standards rise, the entire supply 
chain has to perform according to ISO 9000 
or QS 9000 standards. Suppliers are therefore 
obliged to become certified according to 
these standards.  
This reorganization of the value chain calls for 
closer and more frequent interaction among firms. 
For many suppliers, especially systems suppliers, 
it is therefore crucial to be located in the vicinity 
of the assembly plant. Hence the car industry 
tends to create spatial clusters.  
As liberalization of trade and investment rules 
advances, the car industry in developing coun-
tries has to cope with these global trends. Until 
the mid-1990s, many developing countries, espe-
cially those with relatively large domestic mar-
kets, pursued protectionist policies to develop 
national automobile – or at least automobile sup-
plier – industries. Most of these countries had 
introduced high tariffs for imported cars, thus 
inducing foreign carmakers to build local assem-
bly plants in order to serve the respective domes-
tic markets. Some countries, following the exam-
ple of Hyundai, tried to go beyond such a TNC-
driven strategy and pursued National Car projects 
aimed at developing their own nationally owned 
automobile brands with a more or less complete 
local supplier base.  
In addition to high import tariffs, governments 
imposed local-content and other requirements on 
carmakers in order to build local supplier net-
works. By the mid-1990s, these policies had led to 
the formation of about 500 auto-part suppliers in 
Mexico, about 25 % of whom employed more 
than 1,000 persons. In Brazil the number of sup-
pliers was about 550 with a comparable size struc-
ture, and in Argentina 600, although suppliers 
were on average smaller in the latter country.45 
                                                     
45 Ibid.  
Most of these were joint ventures, some were 
100 % local (usually smaller firms using techno-
logical licenses), and some (in most cases includ-
ing the largest ones) were foreign affiliates. Yet as 
import-substitution policies limited trade and 
competition, the emerging automobile (and sup-
plier) industries were usually less efficient than 
world-market competitors. Most models were 
outdated, productivity rates were low because of 
underinvestment and insufficient economies of 
scale, and consumer prices of automobiles were 
considerably above the world-market level. Al-
though undoubtedly some technological learning 
took place, mostly concerning new organizational 
and management concepts and the mastery of 
standard techniques, little progress was made re-
garding the development of innovative capabili-
ties. In the cases of joint ventures and local firms 
producing under licensing agreements, technology 
transfer remained modest because the foreign 
partners systematically sought to avoid any leak-
age of core competences. Also 100 % foreign 
affiliates remained completely dependent on R&D 
conducted in their parent companies.  
Only recently has liberalization exposed transna-
tional affiliates and local companies to interna-
tional competition and forced the automobile in-
dustries of developing countries to modernize and 
restructure. Most governments have already re-
laxed their restrictions on foreign investment in 
the automobile industry. A growing number of 
countries now permit 100 % foreign equity.46 
Moreover, local content, export and technology-
licensing requirements are being phased out and 
import restrictions lifted. Although some Asian 
countries which pursued highly protectionist 
automobile policies (e.g. Malaysia, Indonesia) are 
trying to slow down this process, they are also 
expected to liberalize their markets by 2003.47 
Liberalization of automobile policies will have 
far-reaching consequences. Where countries pur-
                                                     
46 E.g. 1989 in Mexico and 1990 in Brazil.  
47 Still in 1999 tariffs protecting Proton ranged from 42 % 
to 300 % but are due to come down to 5 % by 2003 (Far 
Eastern Economic Review, April 13, 2000). 
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sued National Car projects, such as the Proton 
brand in Malaysia and Astra in Indonesia, these 
will hardly be able to continue without selling a 
majority stake to one of the large foreign car 
companies and becoming part of the latter’s 
global production networks. National markets are 
too small and technology levels too far behind the 
international frontier to compete in liberalized 
markets. Where the automobile industry is domi-
nated by TNCs, as in most developing countries, 
TNCs will move away from multi-domestic pro-
duction, where local assembly plants with subop-
timal scales of production have assembled a broad 
range of models for the respective national mar-
ket, and start to integrate global or at least re-
gional (e.g. MERCOSUR and ASEAN) networks 
of specialized affiliates sharing parts and manu-
facturing processes. This means that TNCs will 
rationalize production, serve larger markets from 
a limited number of assembly plants and intensify 
intracorporate trade. Some plants may be closed, 
others will specialize in certain product lines and 
build economies of scale. For example, Ford 
shifted its entire Escort production to Mexico, 
Volkswagen its New Beetle to Mexico, Fiat its 
Uno and Panda to Brazil. These changes require 
modernizing the developing country’s subsidiaries 
in order to prepare them for global competition. In 
fact, productivity and economies of scale of for-
eign affiliates have already improved dramati-
cally. 
With modernization of assembly plants and their 
reorientation towards a global or regional division 
of labor, TNCs need to modernize their supplier 
base as well. In many cases, carmakers induce 
their established home-base suppliers to follow 
them to the respective foreign markets. For exam-
ple, Volkswagen was followed by about 60 of its 
suppliers in China48 (see also Box 3). In this proc-
ess, many inefficient local suppliers are being 
taken over or crowded out.49 As a result, liberali-
zation in developing countries is leading to a spe-
cific form of clusters which are dominated by 
                                                     
48 www.ifc.org/ifc/FIAS/pubs/fdinewsv1n1/index.html. 
49 See case studies on Mexico, Brazil and India in Kilper / 
Pries (1999). 
transnational carmakers and their leading foreign 
suppliers, generating relatively few linkages with 
indigenous firms. As we can see in the case of 
Mexico, four main aspects characterize these TNC 
clusters:50  
– Relatively few companies are involved. Mex-
ican automobile plants usually source from 
fewer than 200 suppliers located in Mexico. 
Many additional parts are either imported or 
produced in-house. 
– The typical supplier pyramid is not fully de-
veloped. A typical Mexican assembly plant 
has about 30 – 50 first-tier suppliers produc-
ing in Mexico, most of them transnational 
firms and joint ventures. In contrast to devel-
oped supplier pyramids, moreover, there are 
only a small number of local part producers 
(on average about 150 per plant) below the 
first-tier level. 
– Technological partnering between carmakers 
and auto-parts suppliers rarely takes place. In 
their respective home bases, automobile 
companies cooperate intensively with special-
ized suppliers in order to jointly improve ex-
isting and develop new technologies (e.g. si-
multaneous engineering). In Mexico, in con-
trast, the entire production system has not yet 
been oriented towards innovations, thus there 
is no need for inter-firm alliances.  
– Almost all the firms in the Mexican clusters 
depend on foreign R&D. So far both the 
Mexican affiliates of foreign suppliers and 
the indigenous companies have concentrated 
on manufacturing without investing in R&D. 
Only a few large Mexican holdings have spe-
cialized personnel and laboratories to develop 
their own innovations.  
Box 3 presents the example of Volkswagen’s 
cluster of transnational suppliers in Puebla. 
On the whole, globalization thus seems to under-
mine the possibilities for developing countries to 
                                                     
50 Cf. Altenburg et al. (1998), pp. 36 ff.; see also  
Humphrey (1998), p. 20 for Brazil. 
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build strong local supplier industries with autono-
mous technological capabilities.51 Yet what I have 
described above is a snapshot of the first years of 
liberalization. In some important markets at least, 
such as China, India, Mexico and Brazil, the pros-
pects might be brighter in the medium term be-
cause the mere size of the emerging automobile 
industry in these countries creates the economies 
of scale needed to develop and sustain a supplier 
industry locally – be they foreign or domestic; 
production in these countries no longer copies 
outdated production processes. Quality standards 
and technological complexity of local production 
are increasing, and companies are taking on the 
responsibility for specialized processes in the 
respective global corporate production system. 
Moreover, leading transnational systems suppliers 
are locating close to assembly plants in develop-
ing countries. Taking into account that incre-
mental innovations continuously arise throughout 
the production process and that some production 
                                                     
51 Based on a study of Brazil and India, Humphrey (1998) 
reaches this conclusion. 
processes are now exclusively undertaken in de-
veloping countries, there may be increasing scope 
for improving products and processes within these 
countries. We may thus assume that not only 
manufacturing but also R&D will be transferred to 
these production sites and that more complex 
technological partnerships between automobile 
companies and suppliers will develop. 
Whether local supplier industries will be able to 
seize these opportunities depends on their ability 
to absorb state-of-the-art technologies and man-
agement systems. As the automobile TNCs mod-
ernize their plants in developing countries and 
make considerable efforts to restructure their pro-
curement systems, they become important agents 
of change. Automobile manufacturers increas-
ingly exert influence on their suppliers. This hap-
pens through a combination of pressure and sup-
port. On the one hand, carmakers demand consid-
erable price cuts and impose more stringent qual-
ity standards and terms of delivery. On the other 
hand, they sometimes support their suppliers. 
Table 2 shows the kind of support carmakers in 
Mexico provided for their suppliers in 1997. Sup-
Box 3: Formation of a cluster of transnational suppliers: the case of Volkswagen in Puebla, Mexico 
Since the 1950s Puebla has been an important production site for Volkswagen. Until the mid 1990s the Puebla plant mainly 
produced outdated models for a highly protected Mexican market, mainly the famous Beetle, a car first developed in the 1950s in 
Germany. The local content of these cars was high, and a considerable share of this local content was produced by 100 % Mexi-
can companies.  
In the 1990s, due to economic liberalization and NAFTA, Puebla became a strategic location in Volkswagen’s global strategy. 
The company invested heavily in the modernization of its Mexican plant. Labor productivity increased from 6.75 cars per em-
ployee per year in 1990 to 23 cars in 1998. In 1997 Volkswagen started production of the New Beetle in Mexico, a technology-
intensive "fun car," mainly for export to OECD markets. This was the first time that an overseas plant became the principle pro-
duction site for a new Volkswagen model, and also the first time that series production did not start in Germany. The manage-
ment team appointed to prepare series production was composed of personnel from the German headquarters as well as the 
Mexican plant.  
With the restructuring of the plant, outsourcing increased. Production of small stamped metal parts and wire harnesses as well as 
some simple services such as canteen management and cleaning services were transferred to independent firms. Nevertheless, the 
supplier pyramid for the new product lines is increasingly formed by European-based companies. 144 suppliers for the New 
Beetle are based in Europe, while only 26 are 100 % Mexican, most of the latter providing only simple items. In order to comply 
with the required NAFTA regional content and move towards a locally integrated supply network, Volkswagen is inducing its 
European suppliers to invest in industrial estates around Puebla. Today, roughly half of the 144 European-based suppliers already 
produce in the NAFTA area, while the other half still export from their home base. By 1998, a total of 75 automobile suppliers 
were located in the Puebla area, almost all of them producing mainly for Volkswagen. About two thirds of these are 100 % for-
eign, mostly German-based, companies. Most foreign suppliers have only recently (after 1995) moved to Puebla. Some of them, 
e.g. Hella, are systems suppliers, and an increasing number supply just-in-time.  
Source: Pries (1999: 36 ff.) 
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port focussed on quality assurance, especially in 
order to help first-tier suppliers to achieve ISO 
9000 or QS 9000 certification. The other fre-
quently mentioned kinds of support (information 
exchange at management level, advice on produc-
tion organization, personnel training) are closely 
related to quality assurance. Support was largely 
confined to first-tier suppliers, which in most 
cases were joint ventures with foreign partners or 
even 100 % foreign affiliates. Indigenous SMEs at 
the lower tiers of the production pyramid did not 
receive substantial support, either from the car-
makers themselves or from first-tier suppliers. 
This pattern enhances the tendency to form exclu-
sive transnational clusters. 
3.3 The apparel industry 
Apparel is not only one of the most important 
industries during the early stages of industrial 
development, and one of the main sources of ex-
port revenues for developing countries, it is also 
an industry in which subcontracting arrangements 
between large and small firms are widespread. 
Moreover, barriers to entry for indigenous SMEs 
are low, especially in assembly operations.  
Apparel production is part of the textile commod-
ity chain which comprises raw materials, yarn and 
synthetic fibers, textile production, apparel pro-
duction, and the distribution of apparel. Apparel 
production in turn may be subdivided into three 
phases: preassembly (including design, sample 
making, pattern cutting), assembly (sewing of cut 
fabric) and finishing (prewashing, packaging etc.). 
Assembly is very difficult to automate and there-
fore highly labor-intensive. Due to this labor in-
tensity, assembly accounts for about 80 % of 
value added in apparel production. Accordingly, 
there is a strong incentive to subcontract this pro-
cess to low-cost producers, either within a given 
country or from high-wage to lower-wage coun-
tries. Subcontracting of apparel assembly is thus 
mainly motivated by labor-cost advantages. In 
some cases, customers contract out to other firms 
to cope with fluctuating demand. The apparel 
chain is therefore quite different from the elec-
tronic-hardware and automobile industries, where 
subcontracting is largely due to the productivity 
gains of complementary specialization.  
The apparel chain is buyer-driven in the sense that 
TNCs, mainly large retailers and brand name 
companies,  
Table 2:  Customers’ support for suppliers in the Mexican automobile industry, 1997  
 % of automobile assemblers 
support suppliers (n=4) 
% of suppliers receive support 
from assemblers (n=19) 
Overall support 100.0 84.2 
Advice on quality assurance  100.0 68.4 
Regular exchange of information at management level   75.0 57.9 
Advice on production organization  100.0 52.6 
Support for personnel training  100.0 31.6 
Hiring out of capital goods    50.0 31.6 
Ad hoc help for short-term problems   75.0 26.3 
Help on maintenance and repair   50.0 15.8 
Advice on investment projects   25.0 15.8 
Research cooperation  25.0 10.5 
Assistance in financing   25.0 10.5 
Source: Altenburg et al. (1998: 41) 
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"play the pivotal roles in setting up de-
centralized production networks in a va-
riety of exporting countries, typically in 
the Third World. (...) Production is gen-
erally carried out by tiered networks of 
Third World contractors that make fin-
ished goods to the specifications of for-
eign buyers."52 
Entry barriers for new garment assembly plants 
are low. Therefore competition is fierce, and mar-
gins are usually low. In contrast, high rents may 
be obtained in apparel marketing. The profitability 
of apparel companies largely depends on two as-
pects: their ability to generate "brand-name rents" 
by building a positive product image and thus 
shaping consumption patterns; and their ability to 
manage the supply chain efficiently, i.e. by orga-
nizing quick and reliable delivery of high-quality 
apparel. Therefore many TNCs in the apparel 
business emphasize the need to build global 
brands and improve their retail logistics, while 
they outsource production to independent compa-
nies.53 Traditionally, subcontractors usually re-
ceived cut fabric and returned the assembled gar-
ment. Today, international retailers and marketers 
increasingly work with full-package suppliers. 
Full-package means that the supplier makes the 
garment according to a design specified by the 
customer, but he himself takes on the responsibil-
ity of sourcing the necessary fabric, yarn and but-
tons and delivering the finished product, including 
labeling, packaging etc. Full-package production 
is spreading rapidly. Even in Guatemala, a low-
wage country with a relatively low level of indus-
trial development, about 25 local companies have 
recently upgraded from mere garment assemblers 
to full-package operators.54 
Full-package (or OEM, Original Equipment 
Manufacturing) production implies considerable 
opportunities to upgrade local SME suppliers.  
                                                     
52 Gereffi (1999), pp. 41 - 42. 
53 E.g. Sarah Lee Corporation, Phillips-Van Heusen, Levi 
Strauss & Co. (ibid., p. 48). 
54 Cf. Altenburg (1999a), p. 20. 
"It enhances the ability of local entre-
preneurs to learn the preferences of for-
eign buyers, including international 
standards for price, quality, and delivery 
of export merchandise. It also generates 
substantial backward linkages in the do-
mestic economy because OEM contrac-
tors are expected to develop reliable 
sources of supply for many inputs. More-
over, expertise in OEM production in-
creases over time and it spreads across 
different types of activities. The OEM 
supplier learns much about the down-
stream and upstream segments of the ap-
parel commodity chain from the buyer."55 
Full-package suppliers may be manufacturers or 
brokers who do not engage in manufacturing but 
rather coordinate a network of firms supplying 
textiles and other inputs, dying, assembling, wash-
ing and packing up the garments. The network of 
producers may involve large assembly plants with 
more than 1,000 employees, but it may also reach 
far down into the informal sector. Sometimes 
multi-layered supplier structures develop: Trans-
national retailers give an order to a broker in a 
developing country; the broker then splits this 
order between several medium-sized garment 
manufacturers, who in turn subcontract parts of 
these orders to a number of smaller workshops 
and outworkers. In many developing countries, 
entire towns and districts of big cities live on this 
kind of apparel subcontracting.56 While the oppor-
tunities for technological learning are consider-
able in the segment of full-package suppliers, this 
is usually not the case in simple second- and third-
tier garment assembly. Yet there are some excep-
tional cases where first-tier suppliers or brokers 
offer advice on shopfloor organization, quality 
standards, etc.57 Box 4 gives an interesting exam-
ple of SMEs benefiting from technology transfer.  
                                                     
55 Gereffi (1999), p. 55. 
56 E.g. Hanson (1991), pp. 59 ff. and Altenburg et al. 
(1998), pp. 74 ff. for Mexico, Visser (1999) for Peru. 
57 E.g. Altenburg et al. (1998), pp. 74 ff. 
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3.4 Some general trends observed in the 
case studies  
The case studies have shown: 
– Firms increasingly specialize in certain stages 
of the value-adding process while at the same 
time intensifying interactions with their part-
ners upstream and downstream along the 
value chain. As the sophistication of produc-
tion processes increases, inter-firm coopera-
tion becomes ever more complex in terms of 
information flows and logistics. Under these 
circumstances, spatial proximity to suppliers 
and customers is an important advantage. 
TNCs are therefore often interested in intensi-
fying linkages with neighboring firms, espe-
Box 4: San Pedro Sacatepéquez – technological learning in a subcontracting firm in Guatemala  
A majority of the inhabitants of the small town San Pedro Sacatepéquez in the highlands of Guatemala earn their living in sub-
contracting firms in the clothing trade. The town has five medium-sized firms (with more than 100 sewing machines each) and 
ca. 250 small producers. In total, they offer about 4,000 jobs.  
A particularly interesting firm is Villa Exportadora (VE). VE is a merger of several informal micro-manufacturers. Owing to 
long-term support by their customer, a transnational, it has become a medium-sized private limited company, which offers 239 
safe full-time jobs. The production site of VE has 225 sewing machines and produces for the main customer in the U.S. In addi-
tion, the 12 partners, as individuals, possess another 500 sewing machines, with which they work in small shops, mostly located 
in their houses. The small shops serve a diversified range of customers, both on the local and export markets. The development of 
VE has gone through four phases: 
1. In the 1970s all VE companies as well as all other firms in the town manufactured only small lot sizes for the domestic 
market, as a rule for boutiques and chain stores, which supplied pattern charts, cloth, and accessories and paid very low 
piece-work rates. Workshop organization corresponded to that of handicrafts, i.e. each garment was manufactured com-
pletely by one worker with one machine. Large customers were not interested in production in San Pedro, since the small 
firms were not in a position to manufacture large numbers of pieces and to guarantee product homogeneity. Moreover, labor 
productivity, as compared to Taylorist serial production, was extremely low. At that time the companies that later formed 
VE had only 10 – 15 sewing machines on average.  
2. In 1988 the U.S. Van Heusen Corp. (VHC) faced a severe bottleneck in supply to the U.S. market. Since the VHC represen-
tative in Guatemala knew that San Pedro was a location of small subcontractors in the clothing trade, he decided to organize 
a group of small manufacturers as subcontractors for VHC. 22 small firms were chosen and received contracts, technical ad-
vice and credits at favorable interest rates to purchase special machines (for buttons, button holes, etc.). A VHC representa-
tive was permanently present in San Pedro during the initial phase so as to supply prefabricated products, ensure quality and 
look after the subcontractors. These contracts stimulated rapid growth of the subcontractors.  
3. In 1993 the local subcontractors of VHC formed a private limited company and set up an office for their administrative 
affairs. Production first remained decentralized in the various production sites of the partners.  
4. In the late 1990s VHC met with criticism in the U.S., because the international subcontractors employed minors and also 
violated other international labor standards. In response, VHC granted the subcontractor VE an interest-free credit for the 
purchase of real estate and the construction of a modern factory building. Production now takes place there on the basis of 
modern organization of work and the required standards of labor law. The economies of scale resulting from these measures 
gave a boost to labor productivity, which is now higher than in many other established large-scale apparel subcontracting 
firms in Guatemala.  
Apart from VE, many other garment firms in the location also benefit from export-oriented subcontracting. Other large customers 
followed VHC’s example and gave contracts to small firms in San Pedro. Although they do not support their subcontractors in 
the same way, they still contribute to job creation, higher incomes and learning processes in management. For instance, almost all 
small firms are working now according to the principles of Taylorist serial production, have modern machines at their disposal 
and are in a position to meet higher quality standards.  
Source: Interviews with partners of VE, the former head of the VHC branch in Guatemala, and small firms in San Pedro Sa-
catepéquez, January 1999 
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cially in standard low-tech items with high 
transportation costs.  
– At the same time, as global competition in-
creases and local markets open up, TNCs 
place higher demands on their partners. Sup-
pliers of parts and components, providers of 
services, joint venture partners and other 
SMEs linked to the value chain must come 
close to international standards concerning 
product quality, price, and terms of delivery. 
This may require substantial scales of opera-
tion. If local companies lack these conditions, 
TNCs often prefer to induce their proven in-
ternational partners to follow them to the re-
spective host country. As a result, transna-
tional clusters may emerge which have very 
few links to the local economy. 
– On the other hand, new windows of opportu-
nity for specialized SME partners are opening 
up. This is due to the deepening division of 
labor, the increasing specialization of firms 
and sophistication of manufacturing activi-
ties. New opportunities arise especially in 
non-tradable business services and niche 
products with limited economies of scale. In 
such areas the potential for technological up-
grading is considerable. In some cases, rela-
tionships have been evolving from a one-way 
relationship of subcontracting or technology 
licensing to a more balanced two-way part-
nership where both partners – not only the 
foreign investor – contribute specific knowl-
edge. 
– Outcompeting and replacing of local compa-
nies also occurs. The integral modernization 
of value chains leads to the replacement of 
less efficient local companies. This may lead 
to a process of concentration among local 
SME partners, or crowding out of local sup-
pliers by international follow investment, or 
replacement by imports. In Mexico, for ex-
ample, economic liberalization led to the 
break-up of existing local supplier relations in 
many manufacturing activities. 
4 Explaining success stories: underlying 
determinants of linkage formation and 
technological upgrading  
The intensity of TNC-SME linkages and the abil-
ity of countries and individual firms to exploit 
such linkages for technological upgrading varies 
greatly, depending on the interplay of three sets of 
factors (Box 5):  
– the existence of SMEs which are able to meet 
high TNC standards, or at least have the po-
tential to achieve such standards within a few 
months or years;  
– the TNC corporate strategy, which may be 
more or less conducive to local SME devel-
opment;  
– the existence and efficiency of a set of sup-
porting public policies in attracting foreign 
direct investment, facilitating technology 
transfer and improving SME performance.  
This chapter deals with the first two factors of this 
linkage triangle, i.e. the competitiveness of in-
digenous SMEs (Chapter 4.1) and TNC corporate 
strategies (4.2). The supporting public policies 
will be treated in Chapter 5. 
4.1 The competitiveness of local SMEs 
The main reason for the weakness of linkages and 
spillovers from TNCs to local SMEs is the lack of 
efficient SMEs able to seize new business oppor-
tunities related to foreign direct investment. Be-
low I shall explore what is necessary  
– to prepare SMEs for partnership with TNCs 
and 
– to enable them to exploit these partnerships 
for technological learning and upgrading. 
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Obviously, there is no general answer to these 
questions since requirements differ considerably, 
mainly according to  
– the envisaged type of partnership: Demands 
on suppliers are not the same as demands on 
distributors or joint venture partners; 
– the motives as to why TNCs seek partnership 
with local SMEs: Partnership may be manda-
tory because host country governments re-
quire TNCs to take on local partners, or they 
may be voluntary; moreover, TNCs pursue 
different objectives in adopting local partners, 
e.g. they may seek partners to acquire new 
technologies, to exploit the advantages of 
specialization, to cut labor costs or to im-
prove access to government bureaucracies. 
Each of these objectives implies very differ-
ent demands on the local partner;  
– characteristics of the industrial activity: Bar-
riers to entry for SMEs are much lower in 
technologically simple, labor-intensive indus-
tries without important opportunities for 
economies of scale (e.g. assembly of gar-
ments, shoes and toys) compared to knowl-
edge-, capital- or scale-intensive activities, 
such as the manufacture of electronic compo-
nents or auto parts.  
The following analysis concentrates on the three 
most relevant categories of direct TNC linkages: 
backward linkages with suppliers; forward link-
ages with market outlets, especially by way of 
franchising; and technological partnering with 
special emphasis on joint ventures. 
4.1.1 SMEs as suppliers to TNCs 
According to the capabilities of the SME suppliers 
and the motives of the TNC customers, three main 
types of supplier relations may be distinguished. 
Barriers to entry are lowest in the first and highest 
in the third case:  
1. Low-cost suppliers with limited organiza-
tional capabilities. Such SMEs do not possess 
specific knowledge-based assets and are usu-
ally less efficient than their customers or other 
potential suppliers both in terms of production 
processes and product quality. Yet lower labor 
costs or their readiness to accept unstable de-
mand conditions may outweigh these defi-
ciencies, especially in technologically simple 
and labor-intensive activities, such as assem-
bly of apparel, shoes and toys. Although most 
TNCs prefer to work with more or less for-
malized suppliers that meet basic social secu-
rity standards, these suppliers may in turn em-
ploy second-tier subcontractors in the infor-
mal sector. Examples have been mentioned in 
Central American apparel production and Ma-
laysian machine-tool manufacturing. One may 
assume that this kind of informal subcontrac-
tors will slowly disappear in global production 
Box 5:  The linkage triangle 
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chains where economies of scale and quality 
standards (including the traceability of prod-
ucts) are gaining importance, while they may 
persist in the manufacturing process for local 
markets.58  
2. Low-cost suppliers mastering modern organi-
zational principles. Compliance with quality 
standards is becoming more and more impor-
tant, especially where production is associated 
with a company or brand name. Even if sup-
plier relations are cost-driven, most TNCs will 
not compromise on quality. Failure of a single 
supplier may threaten the customer’s competi-
tiveness and reputation. Therefore more and 
more TNCs expect their suppliers to accept 
rigid guidelines concerning quality, cost and 
delivery (see Box 6). In many cases, suppliers 
are obliged to implement quality management 
strategies and to become certified by GMP or 
ISO standards. Outsourcing of this kind is still 
                                                     
58 Nadvi`s case study on surgical instruments manufactur-
ing in Pakistan presents an interesting case study of how 
international quality standards lead to a selection and 
concentration process among local suppliers; Nadvi 
(1999). 
motivated by considerations of production 
costs, for example in order to avoid invest-
ments in costly specialized equipment for cer-
tain inputs (e.g. auto parts, machine tools). 
The supplier does not necessarily possess ex-
clusive know-how and may in principle still 
be replaced by in-house production. Yet the 
more the supplier specializes in certain opera-
tions, and the more experience he gains, the 
more the relationship evolves from one-way 
subcontracting to a two-way partnership. 
Companies such as NatSteel from Singapore 
show how suppliers may grow big even if 
they specialize in the seemingly simple proc-
ess of contract manufacturing. Yet barriers to 
entry in the form of technical expertise, capi-
tal costs, cost of certification etc. may be rela-
tively high for this type of suppliers.  
3. Innovative specialist suppliers. Especially in 
technologically complex activities, such as 
electronics and automobiles, suppliers are re-
quired to invest in R&D on their own in order 
to constantly improve their products and par-
ticipate in joint innovation projects (e.g. si-
multaneous engineering) with their TNC cus-
tomers. The suppliers thus build up specific 
expertise which the TNC cannot easily re-
Box 6:  Xerox – Requirement for SMEs to be accepted as suppliers  
SMEs willing to supply parts to Xerox` Mexican affiliate must 
- accept Xerox guidelines concerning quality, cost and delivery; 
- implement just-in-time delivery; 
- accept that inventory belongs to the supplier; 
- accept pay after use; 
- take 100 % responsibility for parts and accept penalties for non-performance; 
- develop a methodology of continuous improvement; 
- accept a company survey conducted by Xerox personnel, analyzing (among other things) the internal organization, conditions 
and layout of plant, quality management, products, equipment, technical resources, input materials, sourcing strategy, produc-
tion costs, secondary activities, clients, evaluation of performance by clients and trade union activities; 
- promise to solve problems detected; 
- establish electronic communication with the client;  
- develop joint strategies and action with Xerox; 
- apply the same principles to second-level suppliers. 
Source: Extract from a Xerox document prepared for Mexican suppliers (Xerox 1997). 
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place with in-house resources. Barriers to en-
try in this segment of innovative suppliers are 
especially high. As very few SMEs in devel-
oping countries are capable of developing in-
novative technologies, the increasing degree 
of specialization between TNCs and suppliers 
sometimes leads to the formation of transna-
tionalized enterprise clusters, with leading 
suppliers from OECD countries following 
their principal TNC clients to production sites 
in developing countries (see Chapter 3).59  
As we have seen in Chapter 2, different types of 
supplier relations do not contribute equally to the 
development of a competitive SME sector. Some 
are based exclusively on low wages and labor 
standards or externalization of environmental 
costs. These linkages are not desirable from social 
and ecological points of view, and furthermore 
rarely create a basis for sustained competitiveness, 
since they do not foster technological learning and 
productivity growth. If firms want to embark on a 
"high-road" strategy of technological upgrading 
that allows them to move into activities with 
higher returns, it is necessary to assess the long-
term development effects of different supplier 
relationships. Promotion should then be selec-
tively targeted towards supplier relations which 
favor technology transfer and skill formation. 
Coming back to the classification of supplier rela-
tions (see Chapter 2), Box 7 illustrates the guiding 
principle of selectively promoting technological 
upgrading from traditional, factor-cost based rela-
tions towards knowledge-based supplier relations. 
In this process, demands on suppliers, especially 
on their innovative capabilities, increase.  
4.1.2 SMEs as customers of TNCs, 
especially as franchisees 
What is necessary to prepare SMEs for entering 
downstream relationships with TNCs, that is, for 
                                                     
59 See Altenburg / Meyer-Stamer (1999), pp. 1703 ff. for 
this tendency to form clusters of transnational corpora-
tons. 
becoming franchisees or other distribution and 
after-sales agents for TNCs? TNCs usually want 
to make sure that partners distributing their brand-
name products or using their business concepts 
strictly adhere to certain quality standards. They 
will therefore more or less closely monitor the 
business practice and performance of their dis-
tributors. The latter must therefore be able to 
manage the business properly. On the other hand, 
the franchising scheme in particular requires 
fewer entrepreneurial skills than an independent, 
non-franchised enterprise. Most importantly, the 
franchisee does not need to develop an innovative 
and viable business concept of his own, and in this 
way opportunities are created for persons without 
any previous experience as entrepreneurs.  
Besides the basic management skills for running a 
business, barriers to entry relate to certain capital 
costs. Would-be franchisees usually have to be 
able to afford  
– investments in the respective marketing out-
let. Depending on the activity, the require-
ments may range from a few hundred US $ 
for renting an office to several million US $ 
in the case of large franchise operations, e.g. 
in the hotel or airline business. According to 
the International Franchise Association, lend-
ers usually expect a prospective franchisee to 
have a viable business plan and a third of the 
total capital needed for the venture;60 
– a single payment for acquiring the right to use 
a franchise name, usually ranging from 1,000 
to 50,000 US $, i.e. according to the kind of 
business and the local price level;61 
                                                     
60 Cf. International Herald Tribune, November 17, 1999. 
61 In Germany, 17 % of the National Franchise Associa-
tion`s members paid entry fees up to 10,000 DM 
(ca. 5,300 US $), while 93 % paid up to 50,000 DM 
(ca. 26,300 US $). Cf. Eli / Vögtle (1997), p. 31. 
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– a royalty which may be a percentage of the 
franchisees turnover or a fixed monthly pay-
ment.  
Franchises may be very successful businesses, and 
learning to manage a franchise may in some in-
dustries imply considerable opportunities for indi-
vidual learning. Yet the opportunities for business 
growth and technological upgrading are quite 
limited. In most cases franchisees are confronted 
with more or less clear-cut ceilings to their 
growth, e.g. because franchise contracts often 
limit the geographical area to be served by the 
franchisee. In the same vein, although it may me 
possible to introduce some marginal improve-
ments on the franchiser’s business concept, there 
Box 7: Technological upgrading of supplier relations 
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is not much scope and hardly any incentive for the 
franchisee to engage in major innovations. This is 
one of the main disadvantages of the franchise 
business. Opportunities for growth and techno-
logical learning are greater if local SMEs develop 
their own business concepts and brand names and 
then use the principles of franchising to expand 
their own markets by developing franchisees 
elsewhere.  
4.1.3 SMEs as partners in joint ventures 
What prepares SMEs in developing countries for 
joint ventures with TNCs and enables them to 
exploit these partnerships for technological learn-
ing and upgrading? To give an answer to this 
question, we first have to distinguish between 
mandatory and voluntary joint ventures. If foreign 
investors have to take on a local partner for rea-
sons of mandatory national equity, local candi-
dates only have to compete with other domestic 
firms, and barriers to entry are therefore relatively 
low. Yet empirical evidence shows that joint ven-
tures forced on an unwilling TNC are rarely suc-
cessful, and they are often unsustainable once the 
equity requirements are withdrawn. Moran shows 
that mandatory shared ownership correlates nega-
tively with both technology transfer and export 
performance.62 
If the partnership is voluntary, the local SME 
must be able to meet the following criteria:63  
– to achieve minimum efficiency standards and 
continuously improve these standards; 
– to analyze their own strengths and weak-
nesses, set forth strategic areas in which an 
alliance may help to complement the assets of 
the SME and accordingly develop a business 
plan for a viable joint venture project;  
                                                     
62 Cf. Moran (1999), pp. 121 ff. 
63 The following criteria are based on Miller et al. (1996) 
and interviews with practitioners at the German Finance 
Company for Investment in Developing Countries 
(DEG). 
– to identify suitable partners, i.e. where a sus-
tainable win-win situation may be antici-
pated. The local candidate should look for 
"developmental firms" (see Chapter 4.2) that 
continuously generate new technologies and 
capabilities, thus creating new windows of 
opportunity for the local partner, and that see 
the local partner as a long-term ally which it 
should help to upgrade and cope with the 
changing environment;  
– to carefully negotiate contracts which are 
favorable in the long run, taking into account 
the fact that framework conditions and part-
ner relations usually change over time. Major 
points to be negotiated include the equity 
structure, valuation of existing assets, tech-
nology transfer, dividend policy, marketing 
and staffing issues, mechanisms of conflict 
resolution, and the degree of independence 
from parent interference; 
– to be able and willing to overcome typical 
operational problems that arise during the life 
of a joint venture. The fact that products, 
market situations and technologies change 
over time may lead to a differential distribu-
tion of costs and benefits among the partners 
and thus necessitate renegotiations aimed at 
adapting the original contracts;  
– to contribute specific assets to the partner-
ship. As we have seen in Chapter 2, the main 
advantages for foreign investors in taking on 
local partners are related to the latter’s famili-
arity with local politics and government regu-
lations as well as knowledge of local markets. 
We have also noted that these contributions 
may erode as foreign partners learn to handle 
the local way of doing business. In order to 
remain important to their partners, local 
SMEs therefore need a strategy for develop-
ing new advantages.  
4.2 The TNC corporate strategy  
As we have seen, TNCs (as well as each of their 
affiliates in developing countries) pursue different 
corporate strategies which may be more or less 
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conducive to local SME development and techno-
logical learning. These strategies are usually 
closely related to the motive why the TNCs en-
gage in the host country, i.e. – coming back to the 
taxonomy presented above – whether the affiliate 
is seeking resources, markets, efficiency or strate-
gic assets and capabilities. In the past, market-
seeking investors operating in relatively closed 
domestic markets often developed substantial 
supplier linkages. This was so firstly because per-
formance requirements were less rigid and 
economies of scale less relevant, so that barriers 
to entry for local suppliers were low; secondly, 
because host countries often imposed domestic-
content requirements. Resource-seeking and ex-
port-oriented investors, by comparison, created 
relatively few linkages, but these linkages with 
local suppliers were more competitive and sus-
tainable.64 
Beside the motives for investing in a given devel-
oping country, many other aspects shape the cor-
porate strategy and the TNC’s willingness to de-
velop linkages with local SMEs. These include:  
– Degree of technological sophistication and 
economies of scale, because these factors de-
termine the opportunities for developing local 
partners. Most TNCs limit their local pur-
chasing and subcontracting to simple prod-
ucts and processes, such as indirect materials 
(cardboard boxes, plastic and foam-rubber 
packaging materials), metal-stamping, die-
making and subcontracting of assembly op-
erations. Moreover, economies of scale are 
decisive. O’Connor shows that local sourcing 
increased in Penang when electronics compa-
nies switched from scale-intensive mass pro-
duction to more customized products.65  
– Length of time the TNC has been operating in 
a host country. As TNCs gather experiences 
in a given country, they use to recruit more 
managers locally and they acquire more 
knowledge about local suppliers’ capabilities 
                                                     
64 Cf. Reuber et al. (1973), pp. 152 ff.; Dunning (1992), pp. 
450 ff. 
65 Cf. O’Connor (1993), p. 215. 
and local ways of doing business with other 
firms. This is quite clear in the case of 
Penang’s electronics cluster, where local 
sourcing only took off about 15 years after 
the first TNCs had started operations. In the 
same way, the much lower degree of local 
sourcing in the comparable Guadalajara clus-
ter may partly be explained by the fact that 
this cluster has only recently been estab-
lished.  
– Specific corporate culture (which again re-
flects cultural features of the respective home 
countries). For example, several studies have 
shown that U.S. and European electronics and 
computer companies have used their South-
east Asian affiliates for specialized produc-
tion in a global division of labor, therefore 
beginning a process of systematically upgrad-
ing the technology, improving quality control 
and expanding managerial responsibilities of 
their subsidiaries. Japanese TNCs, on the 
other hand, have maintained higher value-
added operations in Japan, while transferring 
only lower-end processes to their foreign af-
filiates.66 In the automobile industry, manag-
ers of U.S. companies are free to expand ex-
ports even at the expense of their own parent 
company, while Japanese parent companies 
explicitly restrict exports of their foreign sub-
sidiaries.67 On the other hand, Japanese TNCs 
have demonstrated a greater propensity to 
form joint ventures.68 But even if we look at 
TNCs from the same home country, differ-
ences in behavior towards complementary 
SMEs may be considerable. Some TNCs pur-
sue comprehensive outsourcing strategies and 
tend to drastically reduce in-house produc-
tion. This applies to "virtual" companies such 
as Dell Computers or Dual (a German con-
sumer electronics manufacturer), while their 
respective competitors prefer to maintain 
considerable in-house capacities. Extensive 
outsourcing usually requires building up 
                                                     
66 Cf. Moran (1999), p. 75. 
67 Cf. Moran (1999), p. 59. 
68 Ibid, p. 120, based on Beamish / Delios (1997). 
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long-term partnerships and investing in com-
prehensive supplier development schemes. 
Depending on their strategy, TNCs may form 
foreign enclaves with almost no local spill-
overs (e.g. many apparel companies in Free 
Production Zones), but they may also be de-
velopmental enterprises which create new 
productive capabilities and opportunities, in-
crease technological diversity and induce 
technological learning in its business envi-
ronment (Box 8). This developmental role is 
more common in industrialized countries 
where more innovative SMEs exist to fill in 
the many "interstices" created by dynamic 
TNCs. Yet some of these aspects may be ob-
served in developing countries as well, e.g. 
the above-mentioned case of Intel in Penang: 
– Geographic proximity and transaction costs 
between parent company and affiliates. Asian 
affiliates of American TNCs do more local 
sourcing than do Mexican affiliates of the 
same corporations, because a plant in Mexico 
can easily be served by established suppliers 
from the United States. The same goes for 
German TNCs, whose Asian affiliates source 
more locally than subsidiaries in East Europe 
do.69  
– Market position. Corporations operating in 
price-sensitive markets are more dependent 
on factor-cost differentials than corporations 
enjoying high innovation rents. The former 
                                                     
69 Author´s interviews with TNCs in Malaysia and Singa-
pore. 
Box 8:  Characteristics of developmental enterprises 
Developmental enterprises are those which, willingly or not, create new capabilities and business opportunities and induce techno-
logical learning in their environment. Their main characteristics are:  
– Investment is driven by the search for strategic capabilities and assets rather than for cheap natural resources, low wages or 
protected local markets; 
– As they invest in in-house education and training of workers and managers (sometimes in excess of their own immediate 
needs) and participate in public-private partnerships to improve the skill base of their host region, they expand the pool of 
technical and organizational knowledge available in their host country. Some of them spin off new innovative firms; 
– Their corporate culture stimulates continuos innovation inside the company and in its environment; 
– Their corporate culture favors the incorporation of local personnel in management and the adaptation of products and proc-
esses to local markets, norms and values; 
– As they demand new inputs and services and create new capabilities, they generate new business opportunities in related 
(often but not always complementary) fields which they cannot exploit by themselves. This increases the technological diver-
sity of the local economy, deepens the inter-firm division of labor and thus fosters productivity growth in the environment of 
the developmental firm; 
– Their business models are based on networking and inter-firm cooperation. Developmental enterprises often pursue compre-
hensive outsourcing strategies and act as system integrators which initiate and coordinate production networks;  
– Cooperation with other enterprises is based on a vision of synergetic long-term partnerships rather than short-term interests, 
e.g. exploitation of an oligopolistic market position or wage differentials; 
– In the case of TNC affiliates, corporate decision-making is decentralized and local management authorized to source inde-
pendently, develop new products etc. Affiliates are provided with R&D facilities; 
– They are fast-growing, with growth based on productivity dynamics rather than use of additional factors of production. If 
firms are able to reap innovation rents and have a relatively secure market position, there is more scope for long-term strate-
gic partnerships than in companies which are involved in a short-term, cut-throat competition which is common in price-
sensitive markets; 
– They are committed to the local business community and willing to share their experiences as long as this does not jeopardize 
the company’s core competences. 
Partly based on Best (1999) 
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are therefore relatively footloose, preferring 
to relocate if other countries offer cheaper 
production factors. For obvious reasons, foot-
loose investors are less willing to invest in lo-
cal skills and supplier development. Disk-
drive assembler Seagate, for example, closed 
operations in Ireland and Malaysia in order to 
relocate to cheaper countries. Disk drives are 
a technologically mature standard product 
exposed to very stiff price competition. In the 
Central American apparel industry, some 
Asian investors in particular relocated from 
higher-wage to lower-wage countries (e.g. 
from Costa Rica to El Salvador), while U.S. 
brand-name companies rarely relocate despite 
considerable intraregional wage differentials. 
– Trade policy. Despite a general tendency 
towards the liberalization of trade and in-
vestment regimes, trade policy in some cases 
still influences the sourcing behavior of 
TNCs. A typical case is Mexico, where in-
traregional tariffs increase with the degree of 
value added from outside the NAFTA region. 
As a result, carmakers from outside the re-
gion (Volkswagen and Nissan) induce their 
global suppliers to follow them to Mexico to 
increase the NAFTA regional content, while 
assemblers from the U.S. (GM, Ford and 
Chrysler) may continue importing parts and 
components from their established suppliers 
in the U.S.70 For the same reason Japanese 
and Korean producers of color TVs in Mex-
ico reduce their imports by building up local 
supplier basis. As in the case of the carmak-
ers, though, they mainly rely on followers 
from their home countries.71 
                                                     
70 Cf. Altenburg et al. (1998), p. 37. 
71 Cf. Carrillo / Mortimore (1998). 
5 Policies to enhance linkages and 
spillovers between TNCs and local 
SMEs  
5.1 The role of policy and support 
measures 
There is an ongoing debate about the adequacy of 
policy interventions to promote and guide the 
allocation of FDI and to enhance technological 
spillovers in the host economy. And there are 
strong theoretical arguments as well as empirical 
evidence for both proponents of laissez-faire and 
political guidance.  
Under the neoclassical assumption of perfect 
competition, restriction of FDI and imposition of 
policy requirements on foreign investors will have 
negative impacts on economic development. Pro-
ponents of leaving FDI to market forces can in 
fact prove that market interventions have often 
restrained inflows of capital and technology with-
out achieving any of the goals of technological 
spillover and deepening. Especially mandatory 
measures, such as local content, export, joint ven-
ture and technology-licensing requirements gener-
ally have a poor record. 
Critics of the neoclassical approach point to the 
unrealistic assumption of perfect competition and 
stress the importance of market imperfections in 
information, labor and capital markets. Since 
competitiveness increasingly depends on the abil-
ity to learn and master technological development, 
and since these are cumulative processes which 
generate significant externalities, there is much 
scope for market failure. This provides a strong 
rationale for market interventions. Moreover, this 
theoretical approach is backed by empirical evi-
dence of latecomer industrialization in Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan.72  
On balance, it is clear that market failure may be 
relevant and that there is a case for policy inter-
ventions. Yet these interventions have to be mod-
erate and carefully considered to minimize the 
                                                     
72 E.g. Amsden (1989 and 1994), Wade (1990). 
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risks of government failure. The relevant question 
is therefore not whether to support and guide FDI 
or not, but rather to what extent intervention is 
adequate under the specific circumstances of a 
given country. In this respect, we may distinguish 
four degrees of government intervention (Box 9): 
Today there is widespread agreement that  
– FDI is an important means for gaining access 
to and keeping up with technological pro-
gress. FDI should therefore not generally be 
restricted. A nationally led restrict-and-
exploit strategy presupposes very special po-
litical and economic preconditions and be-
comes less viable as globalization advances; 
– investment policies should be quite liberal. 
Restrictions on foreign investors, such as lo-
cal-content, joint-venture or technology-
licensing requirements, should either be abol-
ished outright or at least limited in time and 
linked to performance criteria for the local 
beneficiaries; 
– liberalization of investment policies is neces-
sary, but not sufficient to exploit the opportu-
nities for technological learning. Market fail-
ure is especially relevant in technological 
progress, formation of skills and SME devel-
opment. Support measures in these areas are 
necessary; 
– support should be demand-driven and imple-
mented in close cooperation with leading pri-
vate-sector firms and institutions. 
Coming back to the categories presented in Box 9, 
the optimum level of intervention therefore lies 
somewhere between types 2 and 3, depending 
mainly on the development level of the host coun-
try, i.e. the competitiveness of local suppliers and 
competitors, the strength of its administration, the 
insulation of government from crony capitalism, 
etc. As countries try to upgrade their capabilities 
and enter more sophisticated levels of TNC link-
ages, more policy interventions and support 
measures are required. Yet moving towards a 
more active and interventionist role of govern-
ment requires a high degree of administrative 
efficiency and implies considerable risks. Gov-
ernment must be in a position to assess external-
ities and pick winners and losers more effectively 
than the market does, but without being influ-
enced by rent-seeking behavior of firms. Gener-
ally speaking, the optimum therefore probably lies 
near type 2 for the majority of low-income coun-
tries, while as the competitiveness of the local  
 
Box 9:  Four approaches to FDI policy in developing countries 
Passive open-door policy with 
limited and only horizontal 
interventions to improve sup-
ply conditions 
Open-door policy with active 
and sometimes selective sup-
port measures to improve 
supply conditions 
Strategic target and guide-
policy with selective inter-
ventions to develop ad-
vanced factors 
Strategic restrict and exploit-
policy with strong selective 
interventions 
No industrial policy targets 
defined, no restrictions to FDI 
Wholesale liberalization of 
trade and investment policies 
Few and only horizontal poli-
cies to improve national supply 
conditions  
FDI promotion focussing on 
given factor endowment rather 
than dynamic potential 
Liberalization of trade and 
investment policies, no restric-
tions to FDI 
Some, mainly horizontal, 
measures to improve relevant 
infrastructure, manpower 
training, and to promote the 
location abroad  
Strategic vision and targets 
formulated; 
Selective targeting of "de-
velopmental" FDI; 
Support measures to encour-
age and induce (rather than 
trying to impose) technologi-
cal spillovers 
Selective support to foster 
innovations, develop skills 
for the future and help prom-
ising SMEs 
Strategic vision and targets 
formulated; 
Import and FDI restrictions, 
mandatory technology licens-
ing; 
Technological development 
driven by local firms: market 
reservation policies, export 
promotion, picking winners 
and selective subsidies for 
local companies 
Adapted from Lall (1995), pp. 7 ff. 
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private sector and the administrative capabilities 
develop, a more selective, targeted and guided 
FDI policy may produce better results. Policies to 
enhance linkages and spillovers between TNCs 
and local SMEs should always respect the princi-
ple of subsidiarity. This implies that support 
measures should, wherever possible, be offered by 
private non-profit or for-profit entities which op-
erate at a decentralized level and are therefore 
close to the customer. Public-sector institutions 
should largely restrict themselves to improving 
the general framework for private-sector activities 
and stimulating the development of a market for 
service providers. Temporary public interventions 
are justified if they contribute to market develop-
ment, but government agencies should avoid fur-
ther distortions and withdraw as markets develop. 
This chapter seeks to define promising fields for 
policy intervention and presents some cases of 
best-practice policies. As the linkage triangle in 
Box 5 has shown, there are three main areas for 
interventions aimed at enhancing linkages and 
spillovers between TNCs and local SMEs: 
– general policies to improve the performance 
of local SMEs;  
– policies to attract foreign direct investment; 
– specific policies to upgrade local SMEs in the 
context of TNC linkages. 
Concerning the general policies to improve the 
performance of local SMEs (Chapter 5.2) and 
policies to attract FDI (Chapter 5.3), the study 
will only give a brief overview, taking into ac-
count the great number of existing publications on 
these issues. Yet it should be clear that specific 
linkage policies will hardly be successful if they 
are not embedded in an adequate policy frame-
work fostering competition, investment, technol-
ogy, and SME development. Therefore it is neces-
sary to outline some basic elements of this policy 
framework. Nonetheless, emphasis will be placed 
on specific policies for upgrading local SME 
related to TNCs (Chapter 5.4).  
5.2 General policies to improve the 
performance of local SMEs 
The mature production systems of industrialized 
countries are characterized by increasingly com-
plex relationships between large and small com-
panies. We are witnessing a profound change of 
industrial organization in which SMEs have no 
choice but to assume new roles in order to sur-
vive. The same process of structural change is 
taking place in developing countries, though with 
a certain delay. In the process of industrial mod-
ernization, large companies tend to outcompete 
SMEs in scale-intensive activities, as we will 
presently see in the Latin American shoe and ap-
parel industries. Yet at the same time large corpo-
rations often create new markets for specialized 
SMEs – subcontractors, suppliers of parts and 
components, franchisers, after-sales services – and 
they always leave some niche markets to be ex-
ploited by local SMEs. Although the complemen-
tarities, linkages and spillovers between TNCs 
and SMEs are weak in most developing countries, 
this reflects not a lack of market opportunities but 
rather a lack of efficient SMEs that are able to 
seize these opportunities.  
Industrial (and especially SME) policy should 
help to cope with this inevitable structural change 
and enable SMEs to adapt to the new rules of 
competition. Promotion should aim at developing 
an integrated production system where small 
companies specialize in activities which comple-
ment large-scale production and exploit niche 
markets (e.g. customized products and specialized 
business services). Support measures aimed at 
creating linkages are a main element in such a 
strategic approach towards integrated large- and 
small-scale production.  
Many national and donor-driven SME programs, 
especially in Latin America and Africa provide 
indiscriminate assistance to SMEs and microen-
terprises in traditional activities where they do not 
possess competitive advantages vis-à-vis large 
firms. This may be justified on the grounds of 
poverty alleviation, but it does not help to build an 
integrated and competitive enterprise structure 
based upon the complementary specialization of 
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small and large firms.73 There is clear empirical 
evidence that fast-growing SMEs in innovative 
areas rarely grow out of the existing stratum of 
micro- and small firms, since these usually face 
various internal barriers to growth (lack of mana-
gerial capabilities, technical expertise, skilled 
workforce, capital, growth orientation etc.).74 
Such SME programs may thus be of little help 
when it comes to coping with ongoing structural 
change. 
The challenge is therefore to establish a core 
group of dynamic SMEs. This calls for selective 
policies, including innovation policies for SMEs, 
venture-capital funds for start-up companies, pro-
grams to foster university spin-offs,75 and, last but 
not least, policies to link SMEs up with large 
companies. Since the 1980s, some Asian NICs 
have been focussing their SME promotion on the 
development of specialized SMEs as a comple-
ment to larger corporations in the national produc-
tion system, e.g. as part suppliers, subcontractors 
and providers of knowledge-intensive services.76 
Singapore’s Promising Local Enterprises Pro-
gramme for example targets companies character-
ized by strong core-capabilities, clear vision and 
rapid growth.  
5.3 Policies to attract foreign direct 
investment 
As the global economy becomes more open to 
international business transactions, countries in-
creasingly have to compete for foreign investors, 
                                                     
73 Cf. Cotter (1996), pp. 49 ff. rightly observes that many 
programs do not even make a clear distinction between 
the targets of developing competitive enterprises and al-
leviating poverty. 
74 Cf. Hulme / Mosley (1996), Altenburg (1999b), pp. 27 
ff. 
75 E.g. Chabbal (1995). 
76 Korea and Singapore are the most prominent examples, 
but Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia also have 
a strong focus on growth-oriented SMEs in complemen-
tary fields. See Dae-Woo (1993), Asian Productivity Or-
ganization (1990); Meyanathan ed. (1994). 
and restrictive FDI policies can effectively deter 
TNCs from investing in the respective country. In 
response to this situation, most countries are liber-
alizing their FDI framework. This is in most cases 
accompanied by other growth- and investment-
oriented reforms, e.g. with respect to trade and 
privatization policies. In addition, many countries 
implement pro-active facilitation measures that go 
beyond policy liberalization: 
"During 1997, 151 changes in FDI regu-
latory regimes were made by 76 coun-
tries, 89 per cent of them in the direction 
of creating a more favorable environ-
ment for FDI. New liberalization meas-
ures were particularly evident in indus-
tries like telecommunications, broad-
casting and energy that used to be closed 
to foreign investors. New promotional 
measures included streamlining approval 
procedures and developing special trade 
and investment zones (adding to the 
many zones already in existence). During 
1997 alone, 36 countries introduced new 
investment incentives, or strengthened 
existing ones. The network of bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) is expanding 
as well, totaling 1,513 at the end of 1997. 
The number of double taxation treaties 
also increased, numbering 1,794 at the 
end of 1997."77 
This paper argues that in addition to such efforts, 
three elements are crucial to successfully attract-
ing FDI, especially if the focus is on developmen-
tal TNCs (as characterized in Box 8) which are 
likely to generate considerable domestic linkage 
and spillover effects.  
1. Formulating a vision of technological up-
grading, and targeting FDI to this aim. 
Host countries should formulate strategic 
goals and try to identify windows of opportu-
nity relating to foreign investment, i.e. define 
areas which are promising for national devel-
opment. Policies to attract FDI should not 
only be professional and aggressive but also 
                                                     
77 UNCTAD (1998), p. xix. 
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selective and embedded in a comprehensive 
national development strategy. As a first step 
it is necessary to create a consensus among 
national entrepreneurs, trade unions, policy-
makers, and civil society in general about the 
necessity of technological upgrading. To this 
aim, public agencies as well as private non-
profit entities may therefore promote a stake-
holder dialogue and act as a moderator at dif-
ferent levels. Second, based on this dialogue, 
strategic goals should be set forth. Korea’s 
Highly Advanced National Project 1992-2001 
(Box 10) is an interesting example. Third, ef-
forts should be made to identify which foreign 
investors and activities are especially suitable 
– and at the same time realistic – for achiev-
ing these strategic goals. This requires con-
tinuous monitoring of changes in the market 
and of the specific strengths and weaknesses 
of the location concerned in order to identify 
windows of opportunity.78 Fourth, based on 
this assessment, promotion should be intensi-
fied in order to target specific developmental 
companies and branches.  
2. Creating and promoting a positive image of 
the location. According to Moran, 116 na-
tions are undertaking pro-active approaches to 
attract foreign investment, and this number is 
increasing steadily.79 A study conducted by 
                                                     
78 For an overview of the most important aspects of a 
national "investor targeting strategy" see UNCTAD 
(1999), p. 253. 
79 Cf. Moran (1999), p. 37. 
Wells and Wint shows that promotion was 
highly cost-effective, especially sector-
specific investment missions which were 
combined with firm-specific research and cus-
tomized advertising. General advertising 
campaigns yielded fewer results.80 In Central 
America, investment-promotion agencies such 
as FIDE in Honduras were highly successful 
in selling the image of Honduras abroad, 
which was especially difficult since the coun-
try’s international reputation had severely suf-
fered from civil war and frequent military 
coups. Yet within less than one decade, FIDE 
helped to attract about 100 foreign investors 
in the apparel industry. Investment promotion 
is usually done by public agencies or private 
non-profit organizations. These institutions 
should nevertheless be organized in a busi-
nesslike manner and develop a culture and at-
titude oriented towards the private sector. 
Some of their services may be transferred to 
private service providers. Investment promo-
tion agencies should first of all offer reliable 
information about the location. Some interna-
tional agencies (such as the Multilateral In-
vestment Guarantee Agency of the World 
Bank Group) and private companies provide 
useful information on statistics, legislation 
and other host country aspects. Yet invest-
ment decisions are not only based on such 
"hard facts." Other factors which are difficult 
to measure, such as political stability, long-
                                                     
80 Cf. Wells / Wint (1990). 
Box 10: Korea’s Highly Advanced National Project 1992-2001:  
 Technological targeting based on participatory planning and informed decision-making 
In line with and as part of Korea’s general approach to the preparation of the seventh five-year plan 1992 – 1997, which empha-
sized openness, transparency and consensus-building efforts by integrating views from different social strata, the process of identi-
fication of a select number of core technologies involved experts from government, public and private research institutes and the 
business community. It was based on a systematic survey of key technology areas at world level with a view to identifying those 
fields of generic technologies where Korea was seen to have a potential capacity to compete with the advanced countries based on 
Korea’s existing industrial foundation. As a result, 11 core technologies were initially selected, which number was increased to 17 
after a review at the beginning of the second phase of the HAN Project starting in 1995. The targets were relatively specific, in-
cluding for example the development of "ASIC design technology for digital HDTV" or of an "electric car of 120 km/h speed." 
Within these 17 fields several hundred sub-projects are to be promoted. 
Source: Altenburg / Hillebrand / Meyer-Stamer (1998:45 f.) 
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term development prospects, the business-
friendliness of public administration, and gen-
eral living conditions, are important factors 
influencing investment decisions. Therefore 
advertising and directly approaching and con-
vincing potential investors may be decisive. 
According to Wells and Wint, personal con-
tact between host country officials and com-
pany managers had more impact than imper-
sonal advertising.81 Often it is helpful to ad-
vertise success stories of pioneering investors. 
This is so because other would-be investors 
tend to observe the performance of these pio-
neers before making their own investment de-
cisions, which is an efficient way to minimize 
risks (follow-the-leader effect).  
3. Improving advanced and specialized fac-
tors in accordance with technological goals. 
Developing countries seek to improve their 
factor endowment in order to attract foreign 
direct investment. Most countries, however, 
focus on a combination of low factor costs 
(especially for labor and natural resources), 
subsidies (which may take the form of grants, 
tax holidays, import preferences, preferential 
labor regulations or subsidized land) and gen-
eral infrastructure (roads, ports). In Porter’s 
terms, these are basic and generalized factors 
(Box 11), which are usually not sufficient to 
                                                     
81 Ibid.; see also Box 13. 
sustain long-term competitiveness.82 Subsidies 
draw off resources from other activities and 
may lead to a subsidy race among competing 
locations while they do not help to improve 
the underlying factors of competitiveness. In 
addition, technological advance leads to a 
sharp decline in demand for unskilled labor 
and certain natural resources. In order to 
achieve the envisaged goal of technological 
upgrading, advanced and specialized factors 
of production need to be developed. These in-
clude specific human-capital formation with a 
high percentage of engineering, science and 
business studies, R&D activities, specific in-
frastructure in fields such as information 
technology, etc. Developing countries may 
benefit from economies of specialization and 
agglomeration if they focus on certain activi-
ties and build up an experienced local pool of 
specialized labor as well as a tissue of cooper-
ating firms in complementary fields. 
Box 12 presents an example of how these three 
elements may skillfully be combined.  
Costa Rica’s government realized quite early that 
it was necessary to stop competition based on 
wages and to search for knowledge-based loca-
tional advantages. Owing to the good level of 
education (illiteracy rate below 5 %, compara-
tively good universities) conditions were favor-
                                                     
82 Cf. Porter (1990), pp. 77 - 78. 
Box 11:  Factors of production according to Porter 
Regarding factors of production, two important distinctions have to be made. The first is between basic and advanced factors: 
– Basic factors are "inherited" by a nation and do not need to be developed through policy efforts. They include natural re-
sources, location climate, unskilled and semi-skilled labor, and debt capital; 
– Advanced factors must be created over time. They include modern digital data communications infrastructure, highly edu-
cated personnel such as engineers computer scientists, and university research institutes in sophisticated disciplines;  
The second distinction is between generalized and specialized factors: 
– Generalized factors can be deployed in a wide range of industries. They include the highway system, a supply of debt capital, 
or a pool of well-motivated employees with a college education; 
– Specialized factors are specific to certain industries. Examples are a port specialized in handling bulk chemicals, a scientific 
institute with expertise in optics or a cadre of skilled model makers for automobiles 
Source: Porter (1990: 77-78) 
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able. As early as in 1987 Garnier, then vice-
minister of economic policy and planning, ex-
pressed the vision of wanting to compete "not 
with other countries in the region, but with the 
Silicon Valley."  
 
Box 12:  Attracting INTEL to Costa Rica 
The example of Costa Rica shows how even a small country can attract high-tech investments. Besides favorable basic factor 
conditions (relatively low labor cost, proximity to the U.S.), Costa Rica’s success is owed to a combination of three kinds of active 
public policy. The country was able to: 
– develop a vision of technological upgrading,  
– aggressively and selectively promote the country abroad, and  
– improve advanced and specialized factors in accordance with its technological goals.  
Costa Rica’s government realized quite early that it was necessary to stop competition based on wages and to search for knowl-
edge-based locational advantages. Owing to the good level of education (illiteracy rate below 5 %, comparatively good universi-
ties) conditions were favorable. As early as in 1987 Garnier, then vice-minister of economic policy and planning, expressed the 
vision of wanting to compete "not with other countries in the region, but with the Silicon Valley." The Figueres government in 
particular (1994-98) made efforts to build dynamic competitive advantages and to attract foreign investments in knowledge-based 
areas (above all information technology, but also biotechnology). 
– A "National Strategy for Investment Promotion" focussing on technology policy has been formulated. 
– The improvement of the telecommunication infrastructure received high priority. Ever since 1990 Costa Rica has had an inter-
national data connection via the Bitnet research net. In 1993 a powerful national network (CRNet) with numerous leased lines 
was set up, which meanwhile also gives several neighboring countries access to the Internet. Most public institutions are net-
worked via optical fiber cables.  
– Education has focused on information technologies. 2,000 persons graduate as engineers in information technology each year. 
President Figueres wanted to provide all pupils with an e-mail address by 1998. A pilot project on "virtual class rooms" has 
been started in cooperation with the U.S. firm Microsoft. Costa Rica ranks second, after Chile, as regards the number of Inter-
net host computers per capita in Latin America. 
– Figueres held regular meetings in order to discuss business experience with a dozen managers from foreign high-tech firms 
with branches in Costa Rica. Accompanied by a team of investment experts, he paid visits to firms like Microsoft, Hewlett 
Packard, and Boeing and invited them to make investments in Costa Rica. 
In the early 1980s some small high-tech firms settled in Costa Rica’s Free Production Zones. They manufactured, among other 
products, electronic components and dentures, or developed software. 
The biggest success so far was INTEL’s decision in 1997 to invest 500 million US $ in a production site for the assembly and 
testing of Pentium-II processors. By the end of 1999 2,000 jobs, in part highly qualified ones, will be created and exports worth 3 
billion US $ be produced. The national value added will amount to as much as 15 %.  
Intel had originally studied several possible sites for construction of its assembly plant, including Brazil, Chile, Mexico, the Phil-
ippines and Thailand. Costa Rica won the competition without offering major firm-specific concessions. Instead, what impressed 
Intel’s management was the country’s focus on an electronics strategy, its willingness to invest in training, and the strong com-
mitment to the Intel project. Especially the facilitation work undertaken by Costa Rica’s investment promotion agency CINDE and 
the President’s personal support for the project were decisive. 
The INTEL production site will trigger follow-up investments by suppliers and imitators. Optimistic sources assume that some 40 
follow-up firms will invest another 500 million US $. Up to now there are 15 projects in the planning stage or in progress, among 
them the supplier Photocircuits with investments of 40 million US $ and 700 new jobs. Hewlett Packard has opened a regional 
service center for Latin America.  
Sources: Inforpress Centroamericana, 20.2.98; Latinoamericano, 20.1.98; Caribbean & Central America Report, 24.1.98; Interna-
tional Herald Tribune 12.3.98; Handelsblatt, 8.12.98; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 26./27.9.98; Miami Herald Edición Costa Rica, 
21.1.98; Spar (1998); www.ifc.org/publicat/FDINEWS 
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The Figueres government in particular (1994-98) 
made efforts to build dynamic competitive advan-
tages and to attract foreign investments in knowl-
edge-based areas (above all information technol-
ogy, but also biotechnology). 
The biggest success so far was INTEL’s decision 
in 1997 to invest 500 million US $ in a production 
site for the assembly and testing of Pentium-II 
processors. By the end of 1999 2,000 jobs, in part 
highly qualified ones, had been created and pro-
duced exports worth 3 billion US $. The national 
value added will amount to as much as 15 %.  
5.4 Specific policies to upgrade local 
SMEs in the context of TNC linkages 
After having given a brief overview of the general 
policy framework necessary to improve the per-
formance of SMEs and to attract foreign direct 
investment, the following section will deal with 
specific policies and support measures to develop 
and upgrade local SMEs in the context of linkages 
with TNCs. These include supplier development, 
improvement of forward integration with custom-
ers, promotion of technology partnerships and 
support measures to enhance know-how transfer 
from TNCs to local SMEs which are not directly 
linked as suppliers, customers or technology part-
ners.  
5.4.1 Supplier development 
Studies on programs to support the development 
of local suppliers to TNCs highlight four impor-
tant "lessons learnt." Supplier policies should:83 
– focus on voluntary measures to support the 
local supplier base rather than to impose do-
mestic-content requirements and market-
reservation policies; 
                                                     
83 See Altenburg et al. (1998), Battat / Frank / Shen (1996) 
and Meyanathan (1994). 
– be based upon a medium- or long-term vision 
concerning the envisaged intrafirm division 
of labor; targets and target groups should 
clearly be defined, and policy-makers should 
have an idea of what types of supplier rela-
tions are conducive to sustainable competi-
tiveness; 
– make sure from the beginning that large cor-
porations are involved in and committed to 
supplier development programs. If the poten-
tial customers do not have ownership in such 
programs, it is likely that public support will 
not meet the customer’s demand;  
– be coherent, well-coordinated and transpar-
ent. In order to provide comprehensive sup-
port, there should be one lead agency for sup-
plier development working hand-in-hand with 
specialized agencies. The lead agency should 
be able to identify the supplier’s needs and 
know where and how to mobilize resources in 
order to solve specific problems. 
Below I shall discuss the record of the most im-
portant measures for supplier support. 
Domestic-content requirements and market 
reservation. Until recently, foreign investors in 
many developing countries were obliged to in-
crease the domestic content of their products by 
using national inputs. This was by far the most 
frequently applied measure for establishing sup-
plier relations in developing countries. Typical 
instruments were local-content rules prescribing a 
minimum amount of domestic value added and the 
reservation of certain supplier markets for national 
firms. These instruments are part of the trade-
related investment measures (TRIMS) that were 
banned after the end of the GATT Uruguay Round 
and which will have to be dismantled during the 
next few years. Yet in practice there is still scope 
for more or less disguised domestic-content re-
quirements and market reservations for supplier 
promotion at the national level. Examples of re-
spective national policies are the National Car 
Project in Malaysia and the Foster Father Busi-
ness-Partner Linkage Program in Indonesia (see 
Box 13). Moreover, rules of origin in free-trade 
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areas defining a regional content are still permit-
ted.  
These rules have effects similar to those of local-
content rules, albeit at supranational level.84 Large 
private companies in Indonesia are expected to 
take part in the so-called Foster Father Business 
Partner Linkage Program. The companies are thus 
expected to help to strengthen the management 
and technological capabilities of SMEs, give 
guarantees for credits to suppliers, and market 
final products of small companies via their own 
channels. While state-owned enterprises have to 
contribute 1 to 5 % of their net gains for SME 
promotion, this is not legally binding on private 
companies. However, there is also pressure on 
them to join the program. This is possible because 
decisions are often taken in a discretionary way so 
that companies depend on good relations with the 
government. Moreover, many foreign investors 
have such great interest in the Indonesian market 
that they readily accept disguised requirements. 
The pressure exerted by the Indonesian govern-
ment resulted in a number of enforced partner-
ships which are of no or only little advantage to 
the contracting companies. In view of this situa-
tion, large companies usually are not sufficiently 
interested in becoming active in the development 
of strong supplier SMEs. Nevertheless, the largest 
private Indonesian companies committed them-
selves to promoting SMEs in the Bali Declaration 
of 1996, and in fact some have come forward with 
promotion programs. About 7 % of SMEs in the 
industrial sector profit from the Foster Father Sys-
tem. 
Opinions on the usefulness of local-content re-
quirements and market reservations are controver-
sial, since such measures diminish the profitability 
of foreign investments and the attractiveness of 
the location, in particular when the suppliers in 
the country concerned are not competitive. The 
mandatory utilization of primary products which 
do not meet international standards in terms of 
price or quality burdens consumers and puts the 
international competitiveness of the final product 
                                                     
84 Cf. Hauser / Schanz (1995), pp. 118 ff. 
at risk. Most studies on domestic-content re-
quirements conclude that these measures led to 
inefficiency and that there was little evidence of 
technological learning.85 
Some authors, however, take a more differentiated 
view, arguing that domestic-content requirements 
and market reservations can under certain circum-
stances be useful instruments to create new oppor-
tunities for domestic firms and to foster technol-
ogy transfer.86 Some successful experience from 
Southeast Asia support this view. These include 
the development of a diversified supplier industry 
in South Korea in the 1980s, where the manufac-
turing of numerous parts, components and ma-
chines for large national firms (chaebols) was 
reserved for national SMEs.87 Another example is 
the development of the national sewing-machine 
industry in Taiwan.88 In any case domestic-
content requirements and market reservations 
should not close the market permanently. What is 
needed are incentives that lead to a gradual ad-
justment to international efficiency standards.  
Even though some success stories exist, on bal-
ance the results of mandatory measures for sup-
plier development have been poor. Modern sup-
plier development programs therefore have shifted 
their focus towards voluntary promotional meas-
ures aimed at strengthening potential local suppli-
ers, better matching of supply and demand, and 
providing incentives for inter-firm cooperation, 
among other things. These measures are increas-
ingly implemented by business associations and 
private non-profit agencies with a businesslike 
attitude. 
Coordination of and information on promotion 
measures. Supplier promotion can achieve sig-
nificant effects if the respective instruments are 
well coordinated and transparent to the potential 
                                                     
85 Cf. Moran (1999), pp. 41 ff. reviews several studies 
leading to a decidedly negative assessment. 
86 E.g. Balasubramanyan (1991). 
87 Cf. Wong (1991), p. 53. 
88 Cf. Dahlman / Sananikone (1990), pp. 38 ff. 
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user. It is therefore recommendable to establish a 
coordination unit that 
– works towards the coherence and packaging 
of existing instruments by seeking to inte-
grate all relevant institutions into the formula-
tion of a joint promotion strategy, and 
– works as a one-stop agency providing infor-
mation on promotion instruments and specific 
advisory services (e.g. via information book-
lets) and establishing contacts with appropri-
ate institutions. 
Such a coordination unit could be part of the pub-
lic sector or business associations. What matters is 
that the unit gains the acceptance and participation 
of all relevant institutions and interested firms. 
Since firms usually have more confidence in 
chambers and associations than in public institu-
tions,89 the former are often better suited as coor-
dinating bodies. However, they too should im-
prove their service orientation. The coordination 
unit should cooperate closely with large firms that 
can help to identify bottlenecks and promotion 
needs of potential suppliers. 
Matching between potential customers and 
suppliers. Lack of transparency of many markets 
hinders the exchange of information between po-
tential customers and suppliers. This applies in 
                                                     
89 For Mexico see, for example, Altenburg et al. (1998), 
p. 82. 
particular to SMEs whose information base is 
often restricted to the local level. Thus they often 
do not realize market opportunities. But large 
firms, also, usually do not have complete informa-
tion on what potential national suppliers offer, so 
that they often fall back on imported inputs even 
if a similar domestic product is available. Three 
instruments can promote matching between poten-
tial customers and suppliers: 
– subcontracting exchange schemes, 
– supplier fairs and exhibitions, 
– information and motivation events for suppli-
ers. 
These instruments can help to set up first contacts 
between customers and suppliers, which, how-
ever, are usually not enough to establish lasting 
cooperation. As a rule, potential suppliers have 
too many internal problems to be able to guaran-
tee regular supply at favorable costs at once. The 
participation of potential customers in matching 
events and their branch-specific capabilities, how-
ever, can help to identify the bottlenecks of sup-
pliers. It is on this basis that the coordination unit 
can find highly specific promotion instruments to 
overcome those bottlenecks. These instruments 
should include advice on manufacturing and logis-
tics, basic and further training, financing, and 
other services. The matching instruments could 
thus be first steps towards an integrated promotion 
scheme. 
Box 13:  The Foster Father Business-Partner Linkage Program in Indonesia  
Large private companies in Indonesia are expected to take part in the so-called Foster Father Business Partner Linkage Program. 
The companies are thus expected to help to strengthen the management and technological capabilities of SMEs, give guarantees 
for credits to suppliers, and market final products of small companies via their own channels. While state-owned enterprises have 
to contribute 1 to 5 % of their net gains for SME promotion, this is not legally binding on private companies. However, there is 
also pressure on them to join the program. This is possible because decisions are often taken in a discretionary way so that compa-
nies depend on good relations with the government. Moreover, many foreign investors have such great interest in the Indonesian 
market that they readily accept disguised requirements. The pressure exerted by the Indonesian government resulted in a number 
of enforced partnerships which are of no or only little advantage to the contracting companies. In view of this situation, large 
companies usually are not sufficiently interested in becoming active in the development of strong supplier SMEs. Nevertheless, 
the largest private Indonesian companies committed themselves to promoting SMEs in the Bali Declaration of 1996, and in fact 
some have come forward with promotion programs. About 7 % of SMEs in the industrial sector profit from the Foster Father 
System. 
Source: Kian Wie (1994), pp. 106 - 107, Swisscontact (1996), pp. 10 - 11. 
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a) Subcontracting exchange schemes (SES) offer 
lists of potential suppliers to interested cus-
tomers. To this end, the staff of the exchange 
office visit potential suppliers and evaluate 
their products and processes so as to give 
valid information to customers. Some SES, 
e.g. in Mexico City, aim at an integrated pro-
motion scheme. They visit potential suppliers 
and – in part relying on know-how of poten-
tial customers – classify them in four catego-
ries: category "A" means that cooperation is 
possible; "B" – cooperation is possible, but 
advisory service is still necessary in some 
fields; firms in category "C" need comprehen-
sive support in the form of integrated promo-
tion measures; category "D" stands for "hope-
less cases," i.e. supplier relations are out of 
the question in the short and medium term.90 
b) Supplier fairs and exhibitions, i.e. reverse 
fairs, give customers the opportunity to ex-
hibit products they would like to source lo-
cally. In Mexico, supplier fairs are organized 
by the Ministry of Trade and Industrial Pro-
motion (SECOFI) in cooperation with cham-
bers and development banks. Firm interviews 
revealed that such fairs are not very successful 
in Mexico for the time being. Of course, con-
tacts are established at such fairs, but supplier 
relations hardly ever evolve because the tech-
nology gap between customers and suppliers 
is too wide. To be more successful, these fairs 
should be more specialized and focus on less 
complex products and processes. At supplier 
fairs and exhibitions for the automobile indus-
try, for example, it does not make much sense 
to exhibit complete systems or integrated 
components for local sourcing. Only at the 
level of simple parts do local SMEs have a 
chance to enter into subcontracting.  
c) Information and motivation events for suppli-
ers are organized in some Mexican federal 
states. Their goal is to provide SMEs with in-
formation on advantages and potentials of 
                                                     
90 Interview with David Cervantes, Head of the supplier 
exchange in Mexico City, June 26, 1996. 
subcontracting for their respective firm and on 
possible government promotion schemes. In 
Aguascalientes SMEs may also visit potential 
customers that present their supplier strate-
gies. The SMEs thus get an insight in the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of subcontracting. 
Establishing contacts in this way is particu-
larly appropriate for micro- and small firms 
that often lack information on market chances 
and promotion schemes. At the same time 
such events stimulate first contacts between 
customers and suppliers and lower communi-
cation barriers. 
Economic incentives to intensify supplier rela-
tions and technology transfer. In Southeast Asia 
there are a number of economic incentives en-
couraging firms to engage in subcontracting. 
These incentives are in part for customers, in part 
for suppliers (see Box 14). However, if there are 
such "expensive" incentives, short-term costs and 
the long-term benefit for the development of in-
dustrial structures must be weighed up carefully. 
Incentives make sense only  
a) if potential customers  have an interest in lo-
cal suppliers; 
b) if the competitiveness of potential suppliers 
with respect to prices, quality and terms of de-
livery does not lag too far behind alternative 
sources (e.g. imports) or vertical integration 
within the customer’s own plant; and 
c) if such supplier relations do not develop with-
out these incentives – otherwise there may be 
deadweight effects. 
5.4.2 Forward integration with 
customers, especially by way of 
franchising 
In most cases franchises develop at the initiative 
of the entrepreneurs and do not necessarily require 
government action or even donor interventions. In 
some countries, private-sector franchise associa-
tions exist which provide services to the national 
franchising community. Moreover, some consul-
tancy firms have specialized in franchise opera-
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tions. Nonetheless, some countries and interna-
tional organizations have adopted programs to 
encourage franchising as an instrument for devel-
oping SMEs. The government of Singapore, for 
instance, has formed a Franchise Development 
Centre and a Franchise Development Assistance 
Scheme. Malaysia’s Ministry of Entrepreneur 
Development has created a Franchise / Vendor 
Division. In other countries multilateral (e.g. the 
ILO in Indonesia) and bilateral (e.g. USAID in 
South Africa and Russia) donors support the de-
velopment of indigenous franchise systems. 
Measures to support franchising include 
– organizing events for building awareness of 
the potential benefits of franchising and pro-
viding information about basic franchising 
principles, minimum requirements for enter-
ing a franchising contract, lessons learnt from 
existing franchising relations, etc.;   
– reviewing the existing legal requirements 
regulating the franchising business. This in-
cludes national legislation on intellectual 
property rights and labor relations. To facili-
tate franchising operations the establishment 
of a one-stop franchising agency may be 
helpful;  
– facilitating contacts between international 
franchisers and potential local franchisees, 
e.g. by way of organizing franchise fairs. In 
some countries such fairs are held annually,91 
providing an opportunity for will-be franchi-
sees to compare different franchise systems 
and to receive information about financial 
and other support;  
– encouraging and supporting the establishment 
of national franchising associations. Such as-
sociations exist in most large developing 
countries. Franchise associations may "pro-
vide a forum for the discussion of common 
problems, establish a code of ethics to protect 
the reputation of the franchise community, 
identify policy and regulatory concerns which 
can be raised with government agencies, dis-
tribute general information on basic franchise 
principles and franchise opportunities, and 
publicize successful franchise experiences;"92 
– providing consultancy and training for poten-
tial franchisees during the initial phases of es-
                                                     
91 The largest franchise fairs are taking place in the USA, 
France and Germany.  
92 Henriques / Nelson (1997), p. 29. 
Box 14:  Incentives to intensify supplier relations and technology transfer in Southeast Asia 
Incentives for customers: Large industrial firms in Malaysia receive tax relief of 5 % if they buy primary products from national 
SMEs. This incentive, though, has not yet been really successful since it presumably does not make up for the cost disadvantages 
of the suppliers.a 
The Center-Satellite Factory System in Taiwan, in contrast, is considered to be quite successful. The System comprises a whole 
package of tax depreciation possibilities, subsidies and advisory services by public institutions. The underlying goal is to make 
supplier relations with SMEs more attractive for large firms.b Two reasons go to explain why this measure has had more success: 
first, greater competitiveness of Taiwanese SMEs, which thus become interesting business partners in the eyes of large firms and, 
second, the System combines incentives for customers with advisory services that strengthen the supply side. 
The "Umbrella" Subcontracting Scheme in Malaysia intents to link up small suppliers with large marketing firms (umbrella com-
panies). The latter have the expertise and funds necessary to support SME suppliers in the field of design, manufacturing, quality 
control, and marketing. In return, they are awarded public contracts without having to participate in bidding. The umbrella com-
pany receives a 5 % commission for its services.c 
Incentives for suppliers: Suppliers in South Korea receive soft credit lines for process and product improvement as well as credit 
guarantees (linkage guarantee system). In addition, they are granted depreciation possibilities for investments in laboratories and 
control equipment, and they are exempt from stamp duties.d 
Sources: a) Hoong (1992: 19); b) Dahlman / Sananikone (1990: 108-109); c) Meyanathan / Salleh (1994: 53); d) Meyanathan / 
 Munter (1994: 11) 
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tablishment of contacts, negotiation of con-
tracts and setup of the new enterprise; 
– helping to develop indigenous "SME-to-
SME" franchises of the kind that have devel-
oped in some Asian countries (Chapter 2.1);  
– providing finance for franchise operations. 
Due to the low failure rates of new firms us-
ing a proven franchise system, lending to 
such newcomers is less risky compared to 
other start-ups. In addition, the transaction 
costs of lending may be low if funds are 
channeled through large franchisers to a sig-
nificant number of SMEs, taking into account 
that each franchiser will closely monitor the 
performance of his partners. In some coun-
tries development banks offer special credit 
lines to finance promising franchises (e.g. the 
Deutsche Ausgleichsbank in Germany) or 
guarantee a portion of private bank loans (e.g. 
the U.S. Small Business Association). 
5.4.3 Promotion of Joint Ventures 
As we have seen, the imposition of mandatory 
shared ownership has rarely led to the expected 
results. TNCs can be forced to take on local part-
ners, but if the former are not really interested in a 
partnership, they will usually find ways to avoid 
the transfer (or, from their perspective, the leak-
age) of technologies and the dilution of control of 
their local operations. At the same time, the nega-
tive impact of legal requirements or other forms of 
host-country pressure may be considerable, since 
such measures may deter foreign companies from 
investing or at least induce them to cut back on 
the resources they commit to the local affiliate. 
Public policy and business associations should 
therefore rather promote voluntary joint ventures. 
In this respect, most countries offer support in 
three areas: information services for and coaching 
of (potential) joint venture partners; matching 
with foreign investors; and different forms of fi-
nancial support.93 Traditionally, promotion of 
                                                     
93 The following part is based on interviews with practitio-
ners of the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority 
joint ventures has been a public-sector domain, 
especially in developing countries; yet it may be 
more efficient to leave implementation to business 
associations and private enterprises. 
– Information services and coaching is the 
most important field of support. As we have 
seen, joint ventures are complicated partner-
ships. Different expectations and changing 
framework conditions often lead to conflicts 
between both parties, and many joint ventures 
fail. In order to minimize frictions and in-
crease the success rate of joint ventures, a re-
alistic assessment of benefits and risks is nec-
essary at an early stage. Empirical evidence 
tells us that joint-venture partners, especially 
inexperienced SMEs from developing coun-
tries, often lack relevant information and the 
capability to foresee all the implications of a 
joint venture. Public agencies and private-
sector associations may enable local candi-
dates to identify their own strengths and 
weaknesses, assess the contribution expected 
from the foreign partner, and to negotiate fa-
vorable conditions. Even if negotiations have 
led to satisfactory agreements, it is often dif-
ficult to hold the joint venture together, be-
cause framework conditions and power rela-
tions constantly change. Coaching may there-
fore be necessary in subsequent stages of 
joint-venture development in order to match 
different corporate cultures or to help renego-
tiate the terms of cooperation. 
– Matching of local and foreign companies is 
one of the traditional goals of investment-
promotion agencies in both developing and 
industrialized countries, yet it does not seem 
to be a major problem. Many markets are suf-
ficiently transparent so that foreign investors 
know quite well which local partners might 
complement them. Often the local counterpart 
had imported and distributed the foreign part-
ner’s products long before both parties de-
cided to form a joint venture. Setting up data-
bases and organizing journeys of potential 
foreign investors to allow them to meet inter-
                                                                                  
and the German Investment and Development Company 
and Hebgen (1999). 
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ested local counterparts may be a helpful first 
step, but most practitioners feel that these 
matching activities rarely lead to the forma-
tion of new joint ventures. 
 
– Finance may be a relevant problem where 
national capital markets are not sufficiently 
developed. Joint-venture projects often ex-
ceed the local SMEs’ capital funds. Outside 
financing may be difficult to obtain because 
the rate of saving is usually low in developing 
countries, and venture capital is consequently 
scarce. Therefore newly established ventures 
are often undercapitalized, especially if the 
local partner insists on holding a majority 
share. Yet for viable projects, finance is 
rarely the relevant bottleneck. The problem of 
finance is therefore closely related to the abil-
ity to develop a convincing business plan. In-
stead of offering soft loans, public authorities 
should rather help interested SMEs to im-
prove their joint-venture plans, leaving finan-
cial services to the private banking sector. 
5.4.4 Other policies to promote spillovers 
from TNCs to SMEs 
Although private-sector firms are usually very 
careful to avoid any leakage of particular informa-
tion which is part of their core competences, this 
does not apply to know-how concerning universal 
principles of industrial organization. Most TNCs 
are clearly ahead of local companies in fields such 
as human resources management, quality man-
agement, statistical process control, plant layout 
and logistics. As this knowledge is often not con-
sidered part of the specific set of (secret) core 
competences, TNCs may be quite willing to share 
this information, especially if they do not consider 
the local companies to be serious competitors in 
their field. Disseminating this kind of information 
among the local business community may even 
benefit the TNC, since it helps to improve their 
image as good corporate citizens.  
Business associations, international donors or 
other intermediaries may promote and help to 
organize such a voluntary transfer of know-how. 
They may identify the TNC subsidiaries in their 
country or region that are leaders, and therefore 
interesting local showcases, in certain aspects of 
industrial organization, convince these firms to 
Box 15:  The Comité de Empresas Trabajando en Calidad in Toluca, Mexico 
The Comité de Empresas Trabajando en Calidad is a loose association of firms from the Mexican industrial town of Toluca, 
whose management and personnel directors meet once a month for an exchange of experience regarding the introduction of 
quality management and related measures. Meetings take place in turn in the firms involved. Management members report on 
their concrete experience with the implementation of new programs, which is illustrated during a tour of the firm. The focus is 
on problems and solutions in the fields of human resources and total quality management, e.g. new requirements to qualification 
and training measures, more responsibility for the workers, introduction of innovations like group work, suggestion schemes and 
statistical process control or the reorganization of wages and incentives.  
The ILO initiated the first meeting. It helped to coordinate the meeting, work out a model scheme for the firms’ presentations 
and took down minutes and comparative analyses. Since 1997 the meetings have been organized by the Consejo Estatal de 
Productividad in close cooperation with the firms.  
The meeting, as a rule, is a attended by 20 – 30 firms from differing branches of industry. These include SMEs, large Mexican 
firms and subsidiaries of transnationals. In most cases it is the large – foreign or national – firms that host the meeting and pre-
sent their human resources and quality management concepts, while the majority of the other participants are representatives of 
local SMEs, who thus profit from an intense and free transfer of knowledge.  
Source: author’s observations and minutes of the ILO office in Mexico 
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share their experience with local companies, or-
ganize factory visits, and document and dissemi-
nate the respective experience among local com-
panies.  
Such a process is going on in Toluca, Mexico 
(Box 15). Organizing these events in a systematic 
manner and publishing the results in the local 
media may create an additional incentive for 
TNCs to participate, because their commitment to 
the local business community will thus become 
widely visible.  
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